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Preface
Funds and support were provided by the FAHU Foundation (Denmark) to analyze the
Savings Groups Information Exchange (SAVIX) database. The SAVIX has information on
more than 200000 savings groups in 52 countries worldwide. This dissertation discusses
the epistemology, theoretical insights, and empirical findings obtained by applying both
theory-driven and data-driven science to the SAVIX.
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The scientific process is neither unique nor nomic—see Bradshaw et al. (1983) or the
anarchist theory of knowledge of Feyerabend (1975). Two processes of scientific inquiry
are theory-driven and data-driven science. This dissertation analyzes savings groups
using theory-driven and data-driven methods. Simulated realities—based on data-driven
theory—are used to understand the emerging dynamics of savings groups.
Savings groups are grassroots, community-based organizations composed of 15 to 30
members. These organizations—usually supported by international development agencies—
have weekly meetings during a cycle of operations that typically lasts a year. In the
groups, savings are kept in two funds: a fund for loans and a social welfare fund that
covers life-cycle events.
The findings of Papers A to D in this dissertation provide new large-sample evidence
about savings groups, their dynamics, and the factors affecting their financial performance.
In practice, the results of Paper A to D shed light on the best policies to promote
sustainable development with informal finance in a cost-effective way. A theory-driven
approach indicates that the social fund in savings groups stimulates loan allocation
among risk-sharing members, while implicitly covering idiosyncratic risks (Paper A). A
data-driven approach based on Bayesian data-mining reveals that the macroeconomic
environment and the facilitation model of development agencies have a strong influence on
the profit-generating capacity of savings groups (Paper B). Machine-learning methods
further show that business training is not the most frequent program implemented by
development agencies, but it is in fact the most powerful intervention to encourage profits,
particularly when a development agency stops working with a group and leaves a community
(Paper C). Finally, the simulation of a village with artificial agents indicates that the
businesses of savings groups can have higher profits due to the consolidation of social
capital and the competitive advantage created through a process of homophily (Paper
D).
Metatheoretically, the theory-driven and data-driven approaches of this dissertation—
and the complementarity between these approaches—contribute to the epistemology of
data-intensive science. The dissertation concludes that the gelstaltic and quasi-teleological
explanations of the data-driven approach help to the formulation of theories through
inductive and abductive reasoning.
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Theory-driven analysis and data-driven analysis are two prominent processes of scientific
inquiry. In the theory-driven approach, a hypothesis is proposed and tested based on an
expected pre-defined theoretical cause-effect relationship. In the data-driven approach,
data are first analyzed to discover patterns, which are the basis for the formulation of
theories (Kelling et al., 2009).
Data-driven methods are important in many scientific applications. The large Hadron
Collider of the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) applies data-driven
algorithms to reconstruct particle tracks left in silicon detectors (Chen & Zhang, 2014).
In bio-medicine, the analysis of genome sequences starts with the mining of biologically
relevant patterns and afterwards hypotheses are generated for experimental validation
(Blake & Bult, 2006). In development studies, Holloway et al. (2018) apply machine
learning for monitoring the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals.
This dissertation applies methods of theory-driven and data-driven science to large-
sample information on savings groups. Savings groups are community-based organizations
that provide informal financial services to 30 million people around the world, mostly
in Africa (Seel, 2018). These associations are formed, owned and managed by 15 to 30
members—usually women—who meet weekly during a cycle of operations that typically
lasts a year. In the groups, savings are kept in two funds: a fund to provide loans with
fixed interest rates to selected members, and a social fund for members’ welfare.
The activities of savings groups follow a cycle system: at the beginning of a cycle,
groups are formed, leaders are elected, and members agree about the duration of the
cycle, as well as on issues like the contribution of each member to the common fund,
the frequency of meetings, fines, and the procedures for requesting a loan. Saving and
borrowing take place during the cycle. At the end of the cycle, all funds gained in a
group—accumulated savings and retrieved interest—are distributed among the members
according to their savings balances. In the next cycle, the entire process is repeated.
Due to the meaningful role of savings groups for poverty alleviation, major donors and
development agencies—e.g., the Inter-American Development Bank, the Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation, CARE, and Oxfam International, to name a few—currently work with
these groups as a platform to promote sustainable development and financial inclusion
through social programs.
In this dissertation, Paper A applies a theory-driven approach to identify the exter-
nalities caused by the implicit insurance mechanisms of the social fund in savings groups.
The theoretical mechanism proposed in Paper A suggests that behavioral changes arise
from the higher affective and cognitive trust stimulated by the existence of a welfare fund,
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which creates incentives for increasing the number and amount of loans in savings groups.
This hypothesis is tested with panel regressions and quasi-experimental methods. The
findings indicate that the welfare fund goes beyond its social role and acts as an informal
risk-sharing technology to cope with idiosyncratic shocks, which encourages members to
take more risks and larger loans.
Paper B andPaper C apply data-driven methods to identify the covariates influencing
the profit-generating capacity of savings groups. In Paper B, Bayesian data-mining
methods are applied to a database of more than 200,000 savings groups worldwide in
order to identify which micro, meso, and macro factors are related to profit generation.
The results show that external factors are more important than internal group dynamics
for profit generation. Paper C applies text-mining and machine-learning methods to
identify which social programs are good predictors of financial returns in savings groups.
The results indicate that education, income-generating activities, and health programs are
the most frequent social programs provided by development agencies to savings groups.
Business training is not the most frequent intervention, but it is in fact the most important
social program to encourage financial sustainability, particularly after a development
agency stops working with a group and leaves the community.
Finally, in Paper D, the theory about the dynamics of savings groups and the empirical
findings of Papers B and C are synthesized with complex algorithms. These algorithms
simulate an artificial village with savings groups formed by artificial agents. Paper D
compares the profitability of businesses started by members of savings groups to the
profitability of businesses financed by commercial loans. The results indicate that—besides
the self-generation of debt capital—businesses of members of savings groups can have
higher returns due to the consolidation of social capital and the competitive advantage
created through a dual process of homophily. Higher quotas of savings boost profits,
but only up to a threshold, after which a bifurcation pattern—typical of complexity
dynamics—emerges.
The findings of Papers A to D contribute to the literature on informal finance
at the bottom of the wealth pyramid by providing new theory-driven and data-driven
evidence about the dynamics of savings groups and the factors affecting the performance
of these associations. From an epistemological point of view, the dissertation concludes
that data-driven and theory-driven science complement each other in a circular fashion: an
extension of Eisenhardt’s cyclical model is proposed to illustrate how data-driven methods
contribute to theorizing with gestaltic and quasi-teleological explanations that arise from
induction and abductive reasoning.
The next chapter provides a brief background of theory-driven and data-driven sci-
ence. Chapter 3 summarizes the applications of theory- and data-driven methods to the
information on savings groups. Chapter 4 concludes.
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Chapter 2
Theory-driven and data-driven science
The ontological and epistemological underpinnings of a scientific approach depend on
the tradition and interest of researchers (Elragal & Klischewski, 2017). A theory-driven
approach is based on the falsifiability of hypothesis, while in data science the data-driven
approach discovers patterns in data without a pre-defined hypothesis1.
The falsifiability of the hypothesis in a theory-driven approach is a rejection-based
solution to the problem of induction (Popper, 1963). Theory-driven science—framed under
hypothetico-deductivism—formally starts by using theory to produce a hypothesis, which
is afterwards rejected or not rejected based on data evidence. Even ad hoc hyphoteses with
weak theoretical content—which were regarded as undesirable by Popper due to circularity
and lack of testable empirical content (Bamford, 1993)—are considered necessary for
the generation of new theories according to Lakatos et al. (1980). In Paper A of this
dissertation, a theory-driven approach is used to formulate a hypothesis about the financial
externalities that arise from the trust-based mechanisms of social funds in savings groups.
The theory-driven approach is not free of limitations. In some situations, instead of
a rigorous upfront theory, only a narrative selection of related literature—a ‘literature
review’—is presented and linked to a hypothesis (Markus, 2014). As theories are not always
correct or complete, theory-driven science tends to be applied as a type of theory-light
research. Even with the development of a formal theory, a problem with a theory-driven
approach is that a hypothesis can restrict the propositions deduced from phenomena, thus
limiting the amount of knowledge that can be acquired from a rigorous analysis (Harper,
2011).
A data-driven renaissance emerged as an alternative to the theory-driven approach.
The increasing availability of large amounts of information, higher computational capacity,
and the development of novel statistical methods encouraged the use of computationally
intensive data-driven methods. Algorithms ‘learn’ from data in these methods (Kodratoff,
2001), as in data-mining, big-data analytics or machine learning—see Alpaydin (2016),
Witten et al. (2016) or Parish and Duraisamy (2016).
Mazzocchi (2015) traces the epistemological roots of the data-driven approach to the
1There is an ambiguity in the definition of data science, and a debate exists about whether data
science is a new discipline different from statistics; see for example Donoho (2017). Synthesizing the
definitions provided by Cao (2017, pp.43:8), data science can be considered the interdisciplinary science
that transforms data into insights and decisions by following a data-to-knowledge-to-wisdom thinking and
methodology, with the ultimate goal of obtaining data products like e.g. a discovery, prediction or model.
In this thesis, data-driven science is used as synonym of data science, while the data-driven approach is
conceptualized as the analytical endeavor applied in data science to obtain data products.
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empiricist ideas of Francis Bacon and Isaac Newton. In his Novum Organum, Bacon (1620)
makes a distinction between men of experiments (ants) and men of dogmas (spiders),
but highlights the existence of a middle course (bees). In his interpretation of the ideas
of Bacon, Boden (2004) conceptualizes science as data-driven because scientists look for
regularities and anomalies in observational data. Harper (2011, Chapter 1, VII) argues
also that Newton’s scientific method goes beyond the hypothetico-deductive model and
includes propositions derived from induction. Moreover, Harper (2011) interprets Newton’s
hypotheses non fingo passage as one of the first signs of the diminishing role of conjectured
hypothesis in experimental philosophy.
Currently, data-driven science is experimenting a revitalization in the form of techno-
logical empiricism. The use of data-driven methods is advocated as a fourth paradigm
in science, not in the sense provided by Kuhn (1970)—who argues that a paradigm shift
occurs when the dominant mode of science cannot account for particular phenomena—but
rather in the sense of Hey et al. (2009), who claim that scientific transitions are founded on
advances in forms of data and the development of new analytic methods and technologies
to analyze data.
The classification into either data-driven or theory-driven science is not sharp and does
not imply that the data-driven approach is lacking in theory or that data-driven steps
are not part of the theory-driven approach (Niemeijer, 2002). Assume for example that
data science can be conceptualized as the process of using complex algorithms for the
compression of a large data set D into a reduced statistical object δ (Box 1)2. A more
complex program—in the sense of conditional Kolmogorov algorithmics—will be needed to
construct and calculate δ in a data-driven approach compared to a theory-driven approach,
but the compression process is not necessarily theory-free. Moreover, the explanations that
arise from data-driven science can lead to the formulation of theories through inductive or
abductive reasoning.
Similarly, in a Bayesian epistemic framework, the tension about the role of theory
in the data-driven approach may be baseless: for example, let LS (D|Θ) be a likelihood
function and π (Θ) be the prior probability density function of Θ (defined in Box 1), then
by Bayes theorem,
π (Θ|D,S) ∝ π (Θ)LS (D|Θ) ,
where π (Θ|D,S) is the posterior density function of Θ conditional on any theoretical
claim or previous empirical results about Θ, besides the data evidence D, S and the set of
human and/or machine-made decisions.
2In the case of Netflix, for example, the large data set D with information about viewers’ preferences
can be analyzed with data-driven methods to produce a compressed result in terms of δ-recommendations
of videos (see Bell & Koren, 2007). Other δ representations based on D can be point estimates of the
average rating of viewers, or the joint multivariate distribution of age and income of Netflix subscribers.
The corollary of having more complex algorithms in data science is that some type of automation of
the scientific process is implemented for cleaning and analyzing the data. Formally, let H =
⋃
h∈HPh
be the set of h = 1, 2, ..., H P-procedures employed to obtain δ in a theory-driven approach, and let
D =
⋃
d∈DPd be the corresponding set of the data-driven approach. Denote the S-machine-made decisions
in the supersets H and D as Hm ⊂ H and Dm ⊆ D, respectively. If KD(δ|D) KH(δ|D), then ¯̄Dm > ¯̄Hm.
A similar notion to algorithmic complexity is algorithmic probability, which was proposed by Solomonoff
(1964) as a formal theory of inductive inference. Roughly, given a set of hypothesis h and the data set D,
a way to decide which hypotheses has the higher conditional probability P(h|D) is through the Bayes rule
P(h|D) ∝ P(D|h)P(h). Algorithmic probability uses two philosophical principles to suggest a value for the
prior probability P(h): keep all hypotheses that are consistent with the data (Epicureus) and choose the
simplest one (Occam’s razor).
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Box 1: Data-driven science and algorithmic complexity
Proposition 1: Data-driven science as data compres-
sion. Data-driven science can be conceptualized as the
process of creating a δ-statistical representation of a
data set D in the presence of Kolmogorov algorithmic
complexity K(δ|D).
In Proposition 1, data science aims to represent data
with a compressed statistical description through data-
driven methods (Manin, 2013). This proposition is based
on the definitions of algorithmic complexity (Lemma 1)
and the δ-representation of a data set (Lemma 2).
Lemma 1: Algorithmic complexity. Let δ be a descrip-
tion of a data matrix D, and p a program that produces
δ conditional on D when run on a universal Turing ma-
chine T , for |p| the length of p. The algorithmic complex-
ity of δ can be defined with the conditional Kolmogorov
complexity K(δ|D):
K(δ|D) = min {|p|, p : T (p,D) = δ}
Lemma 1 states that a computer program p is applied
to a database D with the aim of producing a compressed
description of D in terms of a δ statistical object. Intu-
itively, an algorithm to produce δ can be considered sim-
ple if it can be described in a few lines of code, and it will
be complex if there is no such short description. Under a
data-driven approach, a more complex program—in the
sense of Kolmogorov complexity—is needed to construct
and calculate a δ representation object.
Lemma 2: δ-representation. Let D 3 {Y,X} be a data
matrix of dimension n × (k + 1), where X is a parti-
tion of explicans for Y. A probabilistic model to obtain
a δ-representation of D is:
π(Y|X, Θ̂,S) −→= (1−γ)π (E [f (X,Θ,S)] ,Ω) +γε
ε ∼ IID(0,σ2ε),
X = [xn,1 xn,2 · · · xn,k] ,n ∈ Z+ k ∈ Z+
D 3 {Y,X} , Θ ∈ Rk, Ω ∈ Rk×k+ γ ∈ R0,1
Lemma 2 suggests an additive mixture of two distri-
butions as the explicit form of δ. The form of δ in
Lemma 2 is convenient but not unique: the object δ
can be, for example, a point estimate of interest or a dis-
tribution function estimated with an algorithm applied
to the D data set. (The δ object is what Cao (2017,
pp.43:8) more generally calls the ‘data product’ of data
science.) In the conditional probability density function
π(Y|X, Θ̂,S), Y depends on observed k-potential ex-
plicans contained in X (equation 2), weighted by the
parameters in Θ—which assign the importance of each
{xn,1, . . . , xn,2} 3 X to the explicandum Y—and a set
S of human and/or machine-made decisions about the
model, which are based on additional information not
available in the data. This additional information, if
irrelevant, will cancel out mathematically—see the last
part of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 in Jaynes (2003).
The conditional density of Y is a γ-convex combination
of an independent and identically distributed (IID) er-
ror term ε and a density π (E [f (X,Θ,S)] ,Ω). In the
density π (E [f (X,Θ,S)] ,Ω), E [f (X,Θ,S)] is the ex-
pectation of a function f (X,Θ,S) and Ω is a k × k
(positive-definite) variance-covariance matrix.
The scalar γ ∈ R0,1 weights the error term ε. The
value of γ measures the degree to which a precise pre-
diction of Y can be made with π (E [f (X,Θ,S)] ,Ω):
the predictability of a phenomenon decreases as γ→ 1
and increases as γ → 0. The limit γ = 0 produces
a degenerate distribution for Y and is a special case
called Laplace’s Demon in philosophy. (For example,
the returns in stock markets or the evolution of El Niño-
Southern Oscillation during the spring predictability bar-
rier are phenomena where γ → 1, while γ → 0 in e.g.
eclipses.)
In the model, Y can be continuous or discrete (Y ∈
R ∨ Y ∈ Z, corresponding to regression or classifica-
tion, respectively). More importantly, the symbol −→=
highlights that data science is a process of orthogonal
decomposition of the observational data contained in Y
into an element that can be explained by the density






















where the symbol ←−= indicates causality from X to Y
in randomized experiments. A deliberate distinction is
made in the use of the terms explicandum/explicans vis a
vis explanandum/explanans: just as in Hempel and Op-
penheim (1948), the terms explicandum/explicans in the
observational equation express the analysis that looks for
an explication of meaning, whereas in the causal equa-
tion the explanandum is a logical consequence of the
explanans. The notation and terminology of the obser-
vational decomposition is congruent with Carnap’s prin-
ciple of total evidence (Carnap, 1945), i.e. the recom-
mendation to use all available evidence when estimating
a probability (Good, 1967).
The correlational structures ofΘ provide a starting point
for understanding the relation between phenomena and
theory-building (Leonelli, 2014) . Recent advances in
orthogonal machine-learning modify the correlational es-
timators Θ to account for counterfactual causality—for
some examples see Chernozhukov et al. (2017), Mackey
et al. (2017), Semenova (2018), Kreif and DiazOrdaz
(2019) or the developments in orthogonal random forests
of Oprescu et al. (2018). With these modified estima-
tors, machine-learning algorithms are used to create a
balance among treated and control groups, as well as to
estimate the conditional expectations of the outcome or
to select variables when there is a high number of covari-
ates. Data science, then, not only provides correlations,
but can also identify counterfactual causality in the sense
of Lewis (1973).
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The prior π (Θ) provides an explicit opportunity to systematically include theory or
any other type of non-quantitative information into the statistical model. In a theory-light





∂ log f (X|Θ)
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or a flat/uniform prior where the role of theory diminishes as the sample size n increases
(Bauwens et al., 2000). At the other extreme, substantive knowledge—be it theoretical,
based on expert opinion, and/or previous empirical evidence—can be deliberately included
in data-intensive science by elicitating π (Θ) on the basis of e.g. Leamer (1983) hierarchy
of axioms to conventions; see Gill (2015). It follows that, under a Bayesian paradigm,
there is not a sharp distinction between theory-driven and data-driven science in terms of
the inclusion or exclusion of theory, but rather a continuum of possibilities depending on
the degree of elicitation of the prior π (Θ).
In this dissertation, theory is not neglected but only minimized during the process of
data compression by data-driven methods. Data-driven methods reduce the need for strong
domain theories as starting points for a scientific analysis, hence creating new epistemic
models that supplement and extend the traditional scientific method (Janowicz et al.,
2015). The role of theory can be minimized in data-driven science through a temporary
abstention from theoretical concepts—this is, through what is refered below as a voluntary
epochē. This is the approach taken in Paper B and Paper C.
The epochē (ὲπoχή) is defined by Sextus Empiricus as the standstill of the intellect
owing to which nothing is postulated nor rejected (Empiricus, 2000). The epochē can be
understood from the point of view of the philosophy of skepticism or the phenomenological
conceptualization of Husserl. In skepticism, epochē is a part of a larger three-stage exercise:
equipollence, epochē, and ataraxia (Massie, 2013). In the modern conceptualization
provided by Husserl, epochē is a refraining from judgment, a suspension of belief which
involves no skeptical doubt, but rather makes a temporary ‘bracketing’ (Einklammerung)
of the role of theory (Drummond, 2007).
In data science, the Einklammerung provisionally allocates theoretical concepts and
preconceptions into a parenthesis, temporarily suspending the beliefs of a scientist. Based
on Husserl’s two moments of phenomenological reduction—the epochē and the reduction
proper (Luft, 2004)—, data-driven science can be seen as an abstention (enthaltung), a
transitory ‘unplugging’ (ausschaltung) of the positing about the world and the reality of
what is experienced, which implies putting temporarily out of action (außer aktion zu
setzen) or out of play (außer spiel zu setzen) theoretical judgments (Moran & Cohen, 2012).
The second moment, the reduction proper—the transcendental insight that a theory is just
an acceptance about the nature of a phenomenon and not an absolute—is fundamental for
a proper balance between the role of theory and the weight of data evidence.
When the temporary ‘bracketing’ of theory is lifted, inductive and abductive reasoning
allow the data scientist to make sense of the emerging patterns obtained with data-driven
methods. Inductive learning implies using samples of data subsets—of inputs and an
output target—to estimate a function able to generalize to new samples in the future
(Domingos, 2015). This is the case, for example, of deep-learning algorithms (see Deng,
Yu, et al., 2014), which can be justified in terms of the universal approximation theorem
(Cybenko, 1989; Hornik, 1991; Lu et al., 2017) and are applied in computer vision and
automatic speech recognition.
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The type of induction that arises from the application of data-driven methods conforms
better with eliminative induction and enumerative induction, than with demonstrative
induction. Data-driven methods—that are based on using multiple data subsamples
for generalization—do not follow the one-case generalization of the mixed hypothetical
syllogism modus ponendo ponens of demonstrative induction (Broad, 1968), i.e. given
a sample xs ∈ X, if a result is in (at least one sample) xs ⊂ X is Θ̂s then it cannot be
said that Θ̂1 = Θ̂2 = · · · = Θ̂s in all xs, for s > 1. By contrast—and in line with the
first induction theorem of Good (1975, pp. 62) that provides an account of enumerative
induction—, in data-driven science, instances estimated from multiple samples increase
the probability of other potential instances in the limit when the number of subsamples s









where Θ̂1Θ̂2 is the conjunction of Θ̂1 and Θ̂2, and so on; see Zabell (2011) and the proof
of the theorem in Huzurbazar (1955), who shows that inductive inference can approach
certainty, but it cannot reach it. Also, Hawthorne (1993) notes that Bayesian induction
is a form of eliminative induction, since in a Bayesian data-driven approach posterior
probabilities and Bayes factors can be used to discard instances with low supporting
evidence. This is the approach taken in the Bayesian data-mining algorithm of Paper B.
Abduction also plays a role in data science when data-driven methods produce unantic-
ipated empirical results. In the classic definition—provided by Peirce (1960)—, abduction
is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis. Piekkari and Welch (2018) concep-
tualize abduction as a process of reasoning aimed to provide a theoretical explanation
for an empirical puzzle triggered by an observation that challenges existing theoretical
frameworks and preconceptions—an unmet expectation that creates a discontinuity and
asks for a theory to make the observation meaningful (Van Maanen et al., 2007).
Based on the classification of Magnani (2011), the kind of abduction applied in data-
driven science can be considered both selective and creative, as data science can lead
to choosing an optimal explanation from a myriad of possible explanations (selective
abduction), but it can also introduce new theoretical models or concepts based on un-
expected findings (creative abduction). The difference between inductive and abductive
data-driven methods is that abductive data science starts the research process with more
theoretical content than inductive data-driven science, in order to allow for a contradiction
between the expected findings and the surprising, anomalous empirical results (Tavory &
Timmermans, 2014).
The inductive and abductive reasoning processes of data-driven science complement the
deductive approach of theory-driven science. Kitchin (2014) notes that data-driven science
incorporates induction into the research design to identify potential questions—hypotheses—
worthy of further examination and testing, before a deductive approach is employed. In
contrast to the experimental deductive design, data-driven science accommodates minimal
theoretical concepts to generate hypotheses and insights ‘born from the data’ rather than
‘born from the theory’ (Kelling et al., 2009)3.
3While experimentation is seen as a gold standard in scientific practice, Hendry and Doornik (2014)
highlight that experimentation is neither necessary (astronomy) nor sufficient (alchemy) to define science.
Serendipity can be a source of scientific discovery, if a meaning is properly assigned to the occurrence
of random events, as in Fleming’s discovery of penicillin or Penzias and Wilson’s discovery of cosmic
micro-wave radiation.
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of the cyclical process of research with theory-driven and data-driven
science. The figure is an extension of the Eisenhardt (1989) positivist view about the interaction
between inductive and deductive reasoning (originally discussed and illustrated in Piekkari and
Welch, 2011, page 8). Source: modified from Piekkari and Welch (2018).
As Kitchin (2014), Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007, p.25) argue that inductive and
deductive logic are two halves of a cyclical process in which induction helps to formulate
new theory from the data and deduction tests theory. Eisenhardt (1989) and Eisenhardt
and Graebner (2007) develop a cyclical model of theorizing with case studies based on
this complementarity of induction and deduction. If Eisenhardt’s model is extended
to replace case studies with data-driven methods (Figure 2.1), data-intensive science
can be conceived as an additional approach to the development of testable hypotheses
and theory through inductive or abductive reasoning. Similarly to case studies, the
data-driven approach generates explanations—through induction and abduction—from
empirical constructs—e.g. principal components or factor analysis—, from empirical
measures—as those that emerged from the patterns identified with machine-learning—,
and from testable propositions consistent with deductive research.
The types of explanations that arise from data-driven science can be framed under the
typology of explanations provided by Evered (1976), who draws a distinction between causal
explanations, gestaltic, and teleological explanations, according to the relationship between
the explicans and the explicandum (Figure 2.2). In the framework of Evered, through
induction and abduction, data-driven methods provide gestaltic and quasi-teleological
explanations for the patterns discovered in data.
In gestaltic explanations, events are understood from the pattern of their relationships
with other events, and the meaning attached to the events depends upon the patterns
and interconnections discovered through data-driven methods. In Paper B and Paper
C, for example, the emerging relationships between variables lead to the discovery of the
variables affecting the profit-generating capacity of savings groups, without the explicit
formulation of a theory ex ante. Paper D in turn provides quasi-teleological explanations,
because, in the complex algorithms of Paper D, the artificial agents make decisions in
order to achieve specific social and economic goals, just as in the anthropological sciences.
In the next chapter, applications of theory-driven and data-driven science to observed
and artificial data of savings groups show the similarities, differences and complementarities
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Figure 2.2: Typology of explanations based on the relationship of the explicans and the
explicanda, according to Evered (1976). Data-driven science provides gestaltic explanations.
Quasi-teleological explanations arise from data-intensive methods based on complex algorithms.
Source: modified from Evered (1976, Fig. 5, p. 273).
between both approaches. Paper A applies a theory-driven approach based on theory
formulation and hypothesis testing using deductive methods. Papers B and C apply data-
driven methods to produce gestaltic explanations through abductive reasoning, on the basis
of eliminative induction (Paper B) and enumerative induction (Paper C). The quasi-
teleological explanations of Paper D—obtained with data-driven theory—complement
the empirical findings of Papers A, B, and C.
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Chapter 3
Empirical applications and simulations
This chapter summarizes Papers A, B, C, and D, which apply theory-driven and
data-driven science to the information on savings groups. In savings groups, low-income
individuals without access to formal financial services create a group and start to accumulate
their savings into funds, which they later use to provide themselves with loans and insurance.
See details in Box 2.
The information on savings groups used in the empirical applications was obtained
from the SAVIX database. In 2009, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation initiated
three large-scale savings group projects and commissioned Village Savings & Loan (VSL)
Associates to build a web-based database to compare the performance of these groups
(Allen & Panetta, 2010). This initiative led to the creation of an online reporting system,
the Savings Groups Management Information System (MIS), which is synchronized with
the Savings Groups Information Exchange (SAVIX) database. The MIS enables users to
collect and store group-level data on over 200000 savings groups in different regions of the
developing world.
The SAVIX database is an unbalanced longitudinal (panel) data set that has quarterly
observations from 2010 to 2017 as the time index and group-level variables as cross-section
identifiers. The database has a total of 233,180 savings groups in 52 countries around
the world, with a high concentration in Africa. The SAVIX includes information about
group-level characteristics, financial variables, and covariates related to the activities of
development agencies working with the groups.
The first empirical application to the SAVIX data in this dissertation is based on
a theory-driven approach: Paper A discusses the externalities caused by the informal
insurance provided by savings groups. In the second and third applications (Paper B and
Paper C), data-driven methods discover the covariates influencing the profit-generating
capacity of savings groups. The chapter concludes with an application of a theory-driven
but data intensive approach based on complex algorithms that simulate an artificial village
where savings groups thrive (Paper D).
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Box 2: Savings Groups
Savings groups are community-based providers of infor-
mal financial services. These associations are formed by
15 to 30 members–—usually women—– who meet weekly
during a cycle of operations that typically lasts 9 to 12
months. Savings group members deposit their manda-
tory savings into a metal box during the meetings and
afterwards loans are allocated to selected members with
the money from the box. Interest rates are fixed by the
group. Some groups also own some property like a cal-
culator or a small hut where they hold their meetings.
During the cycle, groups keep part of the collected sav-
ings as cash in a box due to lack of demand for loans
or groups’ need to accumulate cash before the payout at
the end of the cycle. At the end of the cycle, all the
collected funds and earnings are distributed among the
members according to their savings balances.
The average size of savings groups was explained by Bis-
rat et al. (2012) as follows: while a higher number of
members is needed to accumulate a large sum of money
over a cycle, too many participants leads to adminis-
trative problems as well as a long cycle time, thus cre-
ating an incentive to keep the number of participants
around 20 members. Abbink et al. (2006) explain that
the higher female composition in savings groups is a
consequence of NGOs targeting women partly because
they consider women’s empowerment as a goal but also
because women are often seen as more reliable borrow-
ers. Rasmussen (2012) relates the gender composition
to women’s economic resilience, since savings enable to
cope with income shocks and tide over unforeseen emer-
gencies such as illness or loss of employment (Ghosh &
Vinod, 2017). Anderson and Baland (2002) suggest that
intra-household conflict can explain the high incidence of
female participation in savings groups. Guha and Gupta
(2005) add that targeting women over men in rural areas
is based on the premise that women make a higher con-
tribution to family welfare, since women give priority to
spending their earnings on their children.
Historically, savings groups can be traced back to primal
models of mutual financial association, such as the Hui
in China during the Tang dynasty (618-906 CE) or the
Shê, where a man who was in need of money (Shê-chu)
invited others to cooperate with him and when the req-
uisite number had been secured, the members (Shê-yu)
assembled and fixed the order in which each would have
the use of the common fund. Similar associations are the
Kou, a group of savings and loan associations in Japan
in 1275 CE (McKeever, 2009), the Modjokuto in Indone-
sia (Geertz, 1962), and the Kameti in India. In West
Africa, the main indigenous savings and lending associ-
ations are called esusu—or its variants, like the SuSu
clubs in Ghana (Anku-Tsede, 2013)—, while in Central
and East Africa they are referred to as ikilemba (Ardener,
1964).
Modern savings groups evolved from two indigenous
grassroots financial systems: Rotating Savings and
Credit Associations (ROSCAs) and Accumulating Sav-
ings and Credit Associations (ASCAs). In ROSCAs, the
pooled savings are distributed to the members in rota-
tion, until each member has received a share. In a ran-
dom ROSCA the savings are set aside based on a random
drawing of lots, while in a bidding ROSCA the partici-
pants bid competitively for the pool of savings, which is
allocated to the highest bidder (Handa & Kirton, 1999).
In ASCAs the savings are not instantly redistributed but
rather accumulate in a fund in order to make loans with
a fixed maturity. At the end of the cycle, redistribution
takes place and a new cycle starts.
Facilitated savings groups are promoted by and receive
training from development agencies or the government.
International NGOs—in collaboration with their local
partners—have designed their own group models based
on the principles of ROSCAs and ASCAs. According to
le Polain et al. (2018), the best-known group models are
the Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLAs) ini-
tiated by CARE International and the Savings and Inter-
nal Lending Communities (SILCs) promoted by Catholic
Relief Services. CARE created the VSLA models based
on the ASCA methodology and the indigenous model of
Mali’s local tontines (Karlan et al., 2017). The VSLA
model evolved from an approach designed only for im-
poverished and uneducated rural women into a model
for both literate and illiterate men and women living in
rural areas and urban slums (Allen, 2006). SILCs in
turn are groups formed by self-selected individuals and
the members’ contributions become a source of loans for
improving food security, home repair, and the purchase
of household and productive assets (Vanmeenen, 2010).
Some savings groups also provide informal insurance
to group members. Savings group members contribute
their savings to two funds: the money in the first fund
is used to provide internal credits to members, while the
second fund is a social fund aimed to improve members’
welfare. The money in the social welfare fund typically
covers costs and losses related to natural disasters and
life-cycle events like marriages, funeral costs or the ex-
penses of births (Andrew et al., 2018).
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3.1 Paper A. Externalities of informal insurance:
A theory-driven approach
Formal insurance and informal risk-coping strategies allow low-income households to face
the costs of unexpected shocks caused by health emergencies or natural disasters. Informal
risk-coping strategies include livelihood diversification (Ellis, 2000), migration (Skoufias,
2003), income diversification (Porter, 2012), changes in consumption patterns (Moser &
Antezana, 2002), as well as selling assets, drawing on savings, or borrowing from the
extended family in times of economic hardship (Strobl, 2017).
Another informal insurance strategy that offers to the poor an implicit coverage against
idiosyncratic risks is the welfare fund of savings groups. The money in the social welfare
fund typically covers the costs of losses related to life-cycle events like marriages, funerals,
births or health-related issues (Dercon et al., 2006; Andrew et al., 2018).
Paper A evaluates the effect that the welfare fund has on loan allocation in savings
groups. The theoretical mechanism proposed in Paper A suggests that behavioral changes
arise from the higher affective and cognitive trust stimulated by the existence of a welfare
fund in a group. Cognitive trust is related to the rational perception that, if a risk
materializes, members do not have to face the financial consequences of paying for the cost
of a loss event. Affective trust arises from the expectations of higher reciprocity among
members during emergencies.
Viklund (2003) highlights that when group trust is higher, risk perception is lower.
Positive affective trust particularly leads to lower risk perception and increased risk-taking
according to Moreno et al. (2002). Brandstätter et al. (2002) add that in the presence of
emotional trust, low probabilities of a loss event are overweighted and high probabilities
are underweighted. Given this trust-based transmission channel, Paper A hypothesizes
that the the informal insurance mechanism of the social welfare fund boosts loan allocation
in savings groups.
Formally, let the difference between the estimators of theory-driven science and data-























The estimators ΘH of the theory-driven approach—equation (3.1a)—are formulated
based on a hypothesis H and the algorithmic optimization aims to minimize an in-sample
loss function `(Y − fS(X, Θ̂)); this is, to maximize the in-sample fit. On the contrary,
ΘD—equation (3.1b)—aims to maximize predictive power by splitting the data (for i 6= j
partitions of D). ΘD is the basis of machine-learning algorithms that minimize out-of-sample
prediction or classification errors.
Paper A builds and tests a theory-driven estimator ΘH with the data on savings groups
in the SAVIX. Conditional on other control covariates that can affect loan allocation—
which are contained in an information set Ωw—, Paper A hypothesizes that trust reduces
risk perception and creates incentives for increasing loan allocation in savings groups:
H0 : ΘH|Ωw > 0.
The hypothesis H0 of Paper A is tested with a correlational estimator θc ⊂ ΘH and
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a quasi-experimental estimator θq ⊂ ΘH, using information on 147,580 savings groups
operating worldwide. The estimator θc is constructed using panel regressions. Quasi-
experimental methods—propensity score matching and augmented inverse probability
weighting (AIPW)—are used to estimate the causal effect of the social welfare fund on
loan allocation with θq.
In Paper A, the estimates θ̂c = 1.10 and θ̂q = 1.94 were found to be statistically
significant at a level of less than 1% . The AIPW estimate θ̂q indicates that groups
without a welfare fund allocate on average 9.85 USD loans per member, while groups
with a welfare fund allocate 11.79 USD loans per member, i.e. 9.85 USD plus the point
effect estimate of θ̂q = 1.94. Paper A concludes that in groups with a social welfare fund
members take higher amounts of loans. The findings support the theory that the social
fund in savings groups not only implicitly covers idiosyncratic risks, but also increases
trust among risk-sharing members and stimulates loan allocation.
Paper A contributes to the literature on informal insurance at the bottom of the
wealth pyramid (BoP) by suggesting that informal risk-coping strategies can lead to
investment decisions. Alderman and Paxson (1992) argue that insurance at the BoP
provides a consumption risk protection against income fluctuations. The results of Paper
A indicate that, besides serving as a protection against income fluctuations, the implicit
insurance mechanism of the welfare fund in savings groups stimulates the provision of loans,
and thus promotes sustainable investment strategies. Sustainable investment strategies,
coupled with informal insurance, allow low-income households to make safer investments in
income-generating opportunities that reduce poverty and lead to enhanced wealth creation.
Paper A also advances the knowledge about informal insurance by suggesting that
the welfare fund of savings groups offers to the poor a trust-based risk-coping strategy
with no moral hazard and no adverse selection. Townsend (1995) and Morduch (2006)
note that insurance for the poor is limited by moral hazard, adverse selection, lack of
price discrimination, and failure to achieve economies of scale1. In contrast to the formal
(micro-) insurance contracts for the poor, the informal insurance of the welfare fund does
not create adverse incentives to incur a loss because the money in the fund is used ex post
by a common decision of the members and is not explicitly intended to cover a specific
pre-defined loss event. Adverse selection, in turn, does not arise in the implicit risk-coping
strategies of savings groups because the contribution to the social fund (the premium) is
mandatory and in an amount orthogonal to the risk of the members.
3.2 Papers B and C. Profit generation and social programs in savings
groups: A data-driven approach
The profit-generating capacity of savings groups can be captured with returns on savings
(ROS). ROS quantifies how savings are transformed into loans and thus provides a direct
measure of the collective benefits—the profits—generated in these associations2. ROS can
1Moral hazard arises because the very fact of having a formal insurance may raise the probability of
experimenting a loss if the insured has fewer motivations to avoid the loss event. Adverse selection, in
turn, is the result of riskiest individuals/households being the ones most eager to purchase insurance
in the first place. When insurers cannot anticipate who is most risky, lack of price discrimination may
discourage safer clients from taking a formal insurance.
2Returns are calculated by adding the values of the cash kept in the cashbox, the bank balance, the
property of the group at the end of the cycle, and the loans outstanding. From the sum of these values
are subtracted the value of savings, the property of the group at the start of the cycle, and the debts
of the group. ROS are calculated by dividing the returns by half of the value of savings in a group.
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Figure 3.1: (a) Cross Industry Standard Process for Data Mining (CRISP-DM), and (b)
CRISP-DM adapted for analyzing the SAVIX database with data-driven methods
be influenced by micro, meso, and macro factors. Micro factors are internal group-level
characteristics. Macro factors reflect the macroeconomic environment in which a group
operates. Meso factors are related to the facilitation process of development agencies that
work with savings groups by providing them training and social programs.
Paper B applies Bayesian data-mining to identify which covariates—micro, meso
and macro—are related to the profit-generating capacity of savings groups. Data-mining
discovers patterns in large amounts of information, using data-driven statistical and
mathematical techniques (Larose & Larose, 2014). Instead of being based on a single
model that is vulnerable to specification errors, Bayesian data-mining applies Bayesian
model-averaging to estimate thousands of models with different combinations of explanatory
variables and then summarizes all the results to obtain the probability of each variable
being related to profit generation. A similar approach is applied by inter alia Sala-i-Martin
et al. (2004), Masanjala and Papageorgiou (2008) or Ley and Steel (2009). In Paper
B the existing theories about savings groups are temporarily put it out of play—außer
spiel zu setzen—as no hypothesis is formulated about a specific variable affecting profit
generation. The potential explanatory variables of profits in savings groups are selected
based only on previous empirical evidence and the available information in the SAVIX.
The data-driven process of Paper B is based on the Cross Industry Standard Process for
Data Mining (CRISP-DM)—see Feyyad (1996). CRISP-DM starts with an understanding
of the business and the data, after which data is cleaned to remove noise/outliers and the
data is treated for dimensionality reduction and comparability (data preparation). In the
fourth phase (discovery), modeling searches for patterns. In the fifth phase (evaluation),
the mined patterns are interpreted, and in the last phase the model is deployed. The
The adjustment of the denominator to half of the savings is proposed in Rasmussen (2012, equation 5).
Rasmussen (2012) argues that the division of the stock of savings by two brings ROS closer to the profile
of profit generation in savings groups, because in these associations funds are available for loans not at
the beginning of the cycle but rather at the end of a period of savings accumulation. Thus, on average,
the funds available for loans at any moment of the cycle are half of the funds observed at the moment of
data collection.
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sequence of CRISP-DM is circular but not strict as the process moves moving back and
forth between different phases (Figure 3.1a).
Paper B adapts the traditional CRISP-DM process to analyze the SAVIX. First,
the SAVIX database is combined with external databases: the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators, and the World Risk Report published by the Alliance Development
Works/Bündnis Entwicklung Hilft (BEH), the United Nations University Institute for
Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS). Second, theory/previous empirical evidence
about savings groups is used instead of business understanding as guidance for data
understanding and for evaluation of the results. Finally, after coherent results are obtained
in the evaluation phase, a cleaned version of the SAVIX is deployed for future research
projects (Figure 3.1b).
In Paper B, the principle of indifference—also called principle of insufficient reason—is
applied in order to assign the epistemic prior probability of each variable explaining profit
generation in the Bayesian models. This is, after bracketing theory (Einklammerung),
equivalent states of knowledge are assumed for each covariate, and hence an equivalent
probability is assigned to each explanatory variable a priori in the data-mining algorithm.
The data-driven results of Paper B show that micro group-level characteristics are not
the most important variables for explaining profits. External factors—the macroeconomic
environment and the facilitation model of development agencies—explain almost 80% of
the profit-generating capacity of savings groups. The results about the importance of
external factors are unexpected and challenge the pre-conceptions about the importance
of internal group-level characteristics—like the gender composition of a group or the
member’s attendance to meetings—which have been the focus of the research on savings
groups—see for example Gash and Odell (2013) or Entz et al. (2016).
At the macro level, savings groups operating in countries with a rural and more
dispersed population have a higher probability of positive returns, which suggests that
savings groups are better adapted to serve the rural poor. The most important meso
variables for profit generation are the type of development agency working with a group,
group status—graduated—and the provision of additional (plus) development services.
Graduated groups show higher returns compared to groups under the active supervision
of NGOs, suggesting that the facilitation model of development agencies may not be
providing enough flexibility to supervised groups. This result is in line with Boonyabancha
(2001), Danquah et al. (2018), Jahns-Harms and Wilson (2018), and Gugerty et al. (2019),
who recognize that the type of facilitation model implemented by a NGO has a dissimilar
impact on profit generation.
The higher returns of groups working with development agency B—compared to the
negative effect on returns observed in groups working with agency D—can be explained
by the prioritization of social outputs over financial gains in the case of agency D,
or by the innovations in the basic savings group model implemented by agency B3.
These explanations—obtained through eliminative induction and abductive reasoning—are
gestaltic, as they depend upon the unexpected patterns and the stronger relationships
discovered through data-driven methods in Paper B.
A deeper understanding of the role of development agencies is obtained in Paper
C. Paper C applies data-driven methods based on enumerative inductive learning to
3Agencies D and B both follow a standardized model of savings groups that features 15 to 25 members,
weekly meetings, an operational cycle of 9 to 12 months, and the integration of social development
programs within a group. Agency B, however, offers more flexibility to the groups by implementing digital
platforms that allow members to reduce the frequency of meetings from once a week to once every two
weeks.
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Table 3.1: Bayesian Data-Mining Results of Paper B
Potential explanatory variables Bayesian Probability Importance
of the profit generating point of driving for profit
capacity of savings groups estimates profits generation (%)
Micro variables (group-level characteristics) 21.06
Members’ attendance 0.0006 2.3273 0.3100
Dropout rate 0.0104 5.3539 1.1494
Number of loans outstanding 9.5990 55.7192 6.5517
Women members in a group -0.0001 1.6563 0.0635
Group size 0.0055 3.5198 0.7553
Accumulated loans per member 7.5745 45.4549 5.3355
Welfare fund per member 0.4677 41.2770 4.5701
Fund utilization rate -0.0064 9.4912 1.6251
Urban savings groups 0.0656 3.6412 0.6985
Meso variables (group facilitation by development agencies) 52.00
Provision of additional services -0.5849 11.3580 1.8560
Additional social services -6.4915 68.6892 7.6767
Additional financial services 1.0472 14.4235 2.1536
No facilitating agency 0.0117 2.7099 0.0866
Facilitating agency A 0.0515 2.6467 0.4308
Facilitating agency B 2.5021 26.5281 3.2839
Facilitating agency C -1.3077 16.8697 2.4109
Facilitating agency D -11.6309 96.1777 16.1800
Facilitating agency E -0.4917 7.7627 1.4241
Group status: active -3.3854 30.2865 3.9656
Group status: graduated 8.8459 72.2023 9.5944
Group status: supervised -0.1522 3.7955 0.4794
Formation by field officer -0.0148 2.2494 0.2860
Formation by village agent -0.3563 3.1294 0.5738
Formation by group-paid agent -0.0218 2.4676 0.3534
Formation by project-paid agent -0.0664 2.7570 0.5488
Formation by unpaid agent -0.0173 1.9471 0.1416
Formation by apprentice -0.2029 2.7952 0.5143
Formation: spontaneous -0.0093 2.2391 0.0445
Macro variables (macroeconomic environment) 26.94
Macroeconomic uncertainty 0.0032 2.2486 0.1160
Inflation rate 0.0006 2.4495 0.0633
Age-dependency ratio 0.0020 1.8517 0.1727
Inequality -0.0233 3.4031 0.6604
Financial deepening -0.0142 5.2619 1.0572
Literacy rate -0.0134 3.8144 0.5963
GDP per capita 0.0006 6.1061 1.0036
Population density -0.1987 96.0592 15.0254
Rural population 0.4897 46.5025 4.9910
Poverty (headcount rate) -0.0139 3.0532 0.6720
GDP growth 0.1558 18.6345 2.5787
(*) In the data-mining models, control covariates were included to account for countries, back donors, between-cycles effects
and within-cycle fixed effects. Back donors are institutions donating funds to development agencies, and include the African
Development Bank, the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), the World Bank, the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Master
Card Foundation, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
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Figure 3.2: Inductive algorithms of data-driven science applied to the SAVIX. (a) The text-
mining algorithm indicates that education, income-generating activities, and health programs are
the most frequent programs provided by development agencies to savings groups. (b) Random
forests show that business training is the most important social program for savings groups,
particularly when group graduation is encouraged and there exist a social welfare fund in a group
(green branch on the right side of the regression tree).
identify the most important social development programs for savings groups. Paper C
randomly divides the SAVIX data into training and validation subsamples. Decision trees
are estimated with the subset of training data and the combined result—the forest—is used
to predict the target variable (returns on savings). Paper C takes an agnostic position by
making a voluntary abstention (enthaltung) from development theory, neither postulating
nor rejecting the importance of any particular social program.
The machine-learning results of Paper C identify two patterns in the SAVIX database:
a text-mining algorithm finds that education, income-generating activities, and health
programs are the most frequent programs provided by development agencies (Figure 3.2a);
random forests identify business training as the most important social program for savings
groups (Figure 3.2b). The green branch on the right side of the regression tree in Figure
3.2b shows that graduated savings groups that received business training (1149 groups)
have a median ROS of 99%, with an interquartile range of 37% to 126%. Groups that
received business training but are still supervised by a development agency have a median
ROS of 75% if the group has a welfare fund equal to or greater than 1.24 USD.
The light-blue branch on the left side of the regression tree in Figure 3.2b shows
that health development programs are the second-best predictor of returns in savings
groups. Graduated groups that allocate loans and receive social programs related to health
improvement have an average rate of returns on savings of 75%. If no health or business
programs are offered to the groups, social programs aimed to promote income-generating
activities (IGA) can also boost the financial performance of savings groups.
The data-driven findings of Paper B and Paper C can be used for theory formulation
after the bracketing of theory is lifted, thus complementing the theory-driven approach
in a circular fashion, as in the extension of the Eisenhardt (1989) model illustrated in
Figure 2.1 of Chapter 2. As Chang et al. (2014) assert, one possible way to create theory
more effectively is by iterating between data discovery and theory-building. In this case,
theory-building—based on the data discoveries of Papers B and C—follows a process
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of theoretical-model abduction—which can be considered a pattern of creative abductive
reasoning in the cubic model of Magnani (2011)—and is defined by Schurz (2008, 5, pp.
213) as the abductive task of finding theoretical conditions that describe the causes of the
phenomenon in the theoretical language and that allow the mathematical derivation of
the phenomenon from the theory.
Formally, a theoretical model of profit generation in savings groups—based on the
data-driven findings of Papers B and C—can be framed under a 1-dimensional Itô process
defined in the probability space (Ω,F,P):







where {St}t∈T is a stochastic process that captures the dynamics of savings accumulation,
ω ∈ Ω, S0 := St=0 > 0 are the savings of a group at the start of the cycle, and Bt is a
Brownian motion—a Wiener process—related to the diffusion process σ(s,ω); see Oksendal
(2013). In the Itô integral, µ(s,ω) is a drift process that results from a convex conical
combination of the external factors affecting the drift process (µe)—the macroeconomic
environment and the facilitation mechanisms of development agencies—, and the internal
factors affecting the drift process (µi), which are related to the internal dynamics of
savings groups. These factors also affect the diffusion process through a convex conical
combination of σe and σi. In shorter differential form, the Itô process can be written as:
dSt =
[








dSt = µ(s, t)dt+ σ(s, t)dBt
µ(s, t) = φµ0 + (1− φ)µ1
σ(s, t) = λσ0 + (1− λ)σ1
,
in a state-space differential form, where −∞ < µe, µi < ∞, σe > 0, σi > 0. The
parameters φ ∈ R0,1, λ ∈ R0,1 are weights that measure the importance of external and
internal factors for the drift (φ) and for the diffusion process (λ) of savings accumulation.
The solution of the previous model can be found by applying Itô’s lemma to the natural
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The dynamics of savings can be written as
St = S0 exp
{(
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The expected returns E(rt) in savings groups are:
E(rt) =
(
φµe + (1− φ)µi −
[





Figure 3.3 shows simulations of the theoretical model of stochastic differential equations
for savings groups, that is calibrated on the basis of the findings of Papers B and C. As
suggested by the data-driven findings, external factors—the macroeconomic environment
and the facilitation mechanisms of development agencies—are more important than internal
group dynamics for profit generation, and hence in the model µe > µi and σe > σi. Also,
as external factors explain around 80% of ROS, then φ = λ = 0.8. Figure 3.3c—which
compares the model’s simulations with the observed kernel density of ROS observed in the
SAVIX database—suggests that the theoretical model—calibrated with the data-driven
findings of Papers B and C—properly captures both the observed over-dispersion in
the tails and the leptokurtosis in the distribution of ROS of the groups in the SAVIX
database4. The data-driven evidence of Paper B and Paper C contributes this way to
the theoretical formalization of the factors affecting the dynamics of savings groups.
Paper B and Paper C also contribute to the literature on savings groups by filling the
4Theoretical models, calibrated with data-driven evidence, improve the predictions of chaotic dynamics
as those generated by the Kuramoto-Sivashinsky nonlinear partial differential equation. See for example
Pathak et al. (2018), who hybridize the data-driven machine-learning approach with traditional knowledge-
based models.
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Figure 3.3: Simulation of the theoretical model of savings groups’ dynamics based on the
data-driven empirical findings of Papers B and C. (a) Simulation of the dynamics of savings
accumulation of 1000 savings groups during a cycle of 12 months, (b) simulation of the dynamics
of returns, and (c) density of returns on savings (ROS) in the observed SAVIX database (red
line) and density of ROS simulated with the theoretical model (black line). In the stochastic
differential equations of the model the constants are equal to µe = .55, µi = .25, σe = .51,
σi = .35 and φ = λ = 0.8.
research gap left by qualitative and context-specific studies that produced results that are
not generalizable beyond the local context5. Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) argue that
qualitative and context-specific studies are not a substitute for statistical evidence based on
large samples, such as the evidence presented in Papers B and C. Instead of focusing on
a small set of testable hypotheses—as previous studies framed in a theory-driven approach
have done—Papers B and C use a data-driven approach to disentangle the differential
effects that the micro, meso, and macro environments have on savings groups.
In practice, the results of Papers B and C provide valuable guidance to the efforts of
back donors and development agencies working with savings groups. The findings of these
papers indicate that these organizations should take into account that the macroeconomic
environment, the facilitation mechanisms and the type of social program offered to savings
groups can be more relevant than group-level characteristics for promoting financial
inclusion and sustainable development at the bottom of the wealth pyramid.
3.3 Paper D. Simulating savings groups with artificial agents: Data-
intensive science with complex algorithms
Computational simulations with complex algorithms are a new style of scientific reasoning
that can be added to the list of scientific styles proposed by Hacking (2009) and Crombie
and Shea (1995). Under this paradigm, data science not only analyzes observational data,
5Flynn and Sumberg (2018) for example use interviews to analyze the activities of 57 members of youth
savings groups in Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Ghana, while le Polain et al. (2018) use qualitative
methods to analyze savings groups in the Congo.
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Figure 3.4: Virtual laboratory of savings groups. Figure (a) shows the multi-layered structure
of the model in Paper D, which takes into account the macro, meso and micro factors affecting
savings groups. This factors can be linked to the conversion factors of resources into functionings—
beings and doings—in the Sen-Nussbaum capability approach. Figure (b) is an example of a
village simulated with the complex algorithms of the model in Paper D.
but also generates and analyzes simulated data—this is, artificial data—based on theory.
This new type of scientific reasoning was anticipated by Ruphy (2011, footnote 3).
In Paper D, complex algorithms are used to create large amounts of artificial data
about savings groups. In this approach—based on agent-based modeling, see inter alia
Lemos (2017), Hamill and Gilbert (2016), Rebaudo et al. (2011) or Sengupta and Bennett
(2003)—, the dynamics of savings groups arise from the interaction between external
factors—the macroeconomic environment and the facilitation mechanisms of development
agencies—and the internal behavior of the individuals in the artificial community and the
artificial savings group.
The model in Paper D is a sequence of four algorithms (Figure 3.4a). Algorithm 1
randomly creates an artificial population inhabiting households in a simulated village. In
Algorithm 2, an agent hired by a development agency forms (artificial) savings groups.
Algorithm 3 simulates the dynamics of the group. Finally, algorithm 4 simulates the
financial performance of a business started by the members of savings groups. Taken
together, the four algorithms create an artificial reality, this is, a microverse of agents that
behave with artificial intelligence, as in Guterman et al. (2015)6.
The multi-layered model of Figure 3.4 has a link with the conversion factors of the
capability approach (Sen, 1976). In the capability approach, the real opportunity of
an individual to do or achieve something depends on the conversion of resources into
functionings—this is, states of human beings and activities. The conversion factors can be
personal—internal microeconomic characteristics of a person, like age or gender—, social
(mesoeconomic), and environmental (macroeconomic) (Robeyns, 2003). Just as in the
capability approach, in the agent-based model of savings groups, people exercise agency,
6The oxymoron ’artificial reality’ is not accidental: Paper D formulates a virtual laboratory that
simulates artificial realities as a tool for experimenting with the behavior of savings groups.
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which is the freedom and the ability to choose from the available options to pursue one’s
goals (Sen, 1993), which are in turn shaped by the specific socio-cultural context in which
a person lives (Mchome et al., 2020).
The model of Paper D is as well inspired by the second order simulacra of Baudrillard
(1994)—who motivated the simulated reality of Wachowski and Wachowski (1999). Paper
D creates a virtual laboratory that emulates the behavior of members of savings groups in
an artificial village (Figure 3.4b). The simulations of the virtual laboratory show that the
businesses of the members of savings groups have higher profits due to the consolidation of
social capital and the competitive advantage created through a dual process of homophily.
This result complements the findings in Paper C about the importance of social programs
related to business and entrepreneurship for savings groups.
In Paper D, the startup businesses of savings groups are more profitable and less risky
compared to businesses financed with commercial loans, when social capital is properly
consolidated. The consolidation of social capital is a consequence of the interaction among
agents in the group. Social capital complements the debt capital in the fund available for
loans, creating a competitive advantage that increases business profitability.
Higher quotas of savings in the group were found to boost profitability by raising the
collective fund available for loans, but only up to a threshold, after which a bifurcation
in returns appears7. In practice, the bifurcation implies that field officers—hired by
development agencies for the task of managing a group—face a trade-off between two
possible states when raising the savings quota of a savings group: while the bifurcation
parameter is a potential source of profit, increasing the quota of savings exacerbates the
risk of group failure.
The contributions of Paper D to previous research about savings groups is twofold.
First, it provides quasi-teleological explanations about savings groups formation and
performance, which are formalized in the complex algorithms of the model and create
emerging patterns of savings groups’ dynamics: community agents—the working-age
population in the artificial village—decide to join a savings group in order to have access
to social and financial benefits. Agents in charge of forming savings groups select group
members in order to comply with a gender rule (a preference for women). The interaction
between these dynamics creates emerging patterns not pre-defined in the model, as, for
example, the number of members in a group or those members that fail to provide their
quota of savings.
In practice, Paper D also makes a contribution by providing—to academics, donors
and development agencies—a virtual laboratory of savings groups. As noted by Kort et al.
(2003), virtual laboratories have the potential to become new important research tools,
particularly if reactions of people to virtual environments are similar to those observed in
real environments.
The virtual laboratory of Paper D can be used to perform counterfactual compu-
tational experiments of intervention programs in a community. Development agencies
working with savings groups as a platform to provide sustainable development programs—
like entrepreneurship, agriculture, adaptation to climate change, health and sanitation,
or programs of literacy, education, and women’s empowerment—can use and adapt the
model in Paper D to perform artificial experiments. The impact of intervention pro-
grams and social policies can be evaluated ex ante through artificial experiments in the
7The bifurcation—typical in complexity dynamics (Gao et al., 2016)—is a branching process of the
dynamical system in which the topological structure switches to different states due to a change in a
bifurcation parameter (Crawford, 1991). In the model in Paper D, the bifurcation parameter is the
quota of savings agreed among group members.
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virtual laboratory. The simulation of interventions—before they are implemented—is a
cost-effective way of reducing the risk of failure by taking into account the impact of





The availability of large-sample databases, increasing computational power, and the
prominence of new statistical methods are changing scientific practice and are creating
a momentum to consolidate the epistemology of data science (Leonelli, 2014). Using
applications to a database of savings groups and simulations of artificial realities with
complex algorithms, this dissertation contributes to this momentum by showing how
data-driven methods complement the theory-driven approach.
The results of the applications in savings groups contribute to the literature on informal
finance at the bottom of the wealth pyramid. Previous studies about financial instruments
for the extreme poor have focused on the formal, supply-driven provision of microfinance
arrangements. Paper A to D on the contrary provide new evidence about the internal
dynamics of savings groups and the external factors that affect the performance of these
informal financial associations. In practice, Papers A to D shed light on the best policies
to promote sustainable development with informal finance: specifically, Papers A to D
indicate that academics and practitioners working with savings groups have to prioritize
the provision of business interventions and take into account the potential externalities
caused by the social welfare fund, the macroeconomic environment of the country in which
a group operates, and the facilitation model of development agencies.
Metatheoretically, the dissertation proposes a phenomenological framework for the
epistemology of data-driven science. Based on a transitory abstention of theory, data-
driven methods produce gestaltic and quasi-teleological explanations that can be used to
formulate theory through inductive and abductive reasoning. The complementarity of
data-driven and theory-driven science is formalized by extending the cyclical process of
Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007).
Future studies can discuss the ontology, ethics, and teleology of data-driven methods.
Investigating savings groups and the potential changes in their mechanics with theory-driven
or data-driven methods—in virtual or real environments, with observed, experimental or
artificial data—is a promising research avenue to promote sustainable financial inclusion
and development in a cost-effective way.
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Abstract
Resources for sustainable development are used efficiently when social programs help to promote
simultaneously the financial sustainability of grass-root groups that provide financial access to
millions of low-income households around the world. This study applies machine-learning to a
worldwide database of grass-root groups in order to identify which social programs are good pre-
dictors of financial returns in the groups. The results indicate that education, income-generating
activities and health programs are the most frequent programs provided by development agen-
cies. Business training is not among the most frequent interventions applied in grass-root groups,
but it is in fact the most important social program to encourage financial sustainability in grass-
root groups, particularly after a development agency stops working with a group and leaves the
community. Theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed.
C.1 Introduction
Financial access to low-income households in developing countries tends to be provided by micro-
finance institutions. In contrast to this institutional approach, in grass-root finance individuals
living in impoverished communities create a group and start to accumulate their savings into a
fund, which is later used to provide small loans to themselves.
Grass-root groups receive different names, like inter alia savings groups (Allen & Panetta,
2010), self-help groups (Venkatraja, 2019), rotating savings and credit associations or accumulat-
ing savings and credit associations (Bouman, 1995). Greaney et al. (2016) and Burlando and
Canidio (2017) estimate that over 100 million persons in 10.5 million households participate in
grass-root financial groups worldwide.
Studying the dynamics of informal grass-root finance is extremely important due to the recent
evidence that expanding the access to formal savings and loans will not be enough to broaden
financial access to the poor (Dupas et al., 2018). Grass-root finance arises at the bottom of the
pyramid (BoP) and reaches the poorest population in developing countries, who do not have
access to formal financial services and rely exclusively on grass-root finance to meet their needs
(Burlando & Canidio, 2017).
International donors and development agencies have recognized the relevance of grass-root
finance for poverty reduction. These organizations work with grass-root groups as a platform
to provide communities with sustainable development programs. The agencies help a commu-
nity to organize a financial group, and then provide a development service to the group, like
entrepreneurship, agriculture, adaptation to climate change, health and sanitation, or programs
of literacy, education and women empowerment.
Examples of grass-root financial associations supported by development agencies are the Vil-
lage Savings and Loan Association (VSLA) promoted by CARE International or the Savings for
Changes (SfC) model supported by Oxfam and Freedom from Hunger (Le Polain et al., 2018).
During the implementation of social and financial programs, development agencies work closely
with donors like the Inter-American Development Bank or the Barclays Corporation (Flynn, and
Sumberg, 2017).
Given the wide variety of sustainable development programs that agencies and donors can
provide to grass-root groups, the question arises as to which program helps to promote both the
social and financial sustainability of a group.
A group is financially sustainable when generates returns during the process of savings accu-
mulation and loan provision. Groups that generate returns will have incentives to keep operating
over time and thus will continue providing financial access to bottom-of-the-pyramid (BoP) indi-
viduals. Groups that are financially sustainable may also opt to maintain their social programs
alive, even after the development organization leaves the community.
This study uses machine-learning methods to identify which social development programs
are the best predictors of financial returns generated by grass-root associations. Text-mining
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and random forests are applied to the SAVIX, a database with information of more than 250000
grass-root financial associations worldwide.
The results indicate that education, income-generating activities and health are the most fre-
quent development programs provided to grass-root groups. Training to create small retail busi-
nesses and health interventions are provided less frequently, but interestingly these interventions
are in fact the ones that boosts the profit-generating capacity of grass-root groups, particularly
business training in graduated groups that are no longer supervised by a development agency.
In the practice, the results imply that donors and development agencies that look to achieve
social targets but also want to support financial sustainability can prioritize the provision of health
programs and business training to grass-root groups. In combination with social interventions,
encouraging groups to ‘graduate’ and become an autonomous and unsupervised association further
enhances financial sustainability.
Theoretically, the findings contribute to the business literature by suggesting that grass-root
business stimulated by development interventions can be thought as a new paradigm of sustainable
business, complementary to social enterprises and corporate social responsibility.
Next section describes the methods and data used in the study. Section 3 details the results
and Section 4 concludes by discussing practical implications and theoretical contributions, as well
as the links of the findings with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
C.2 Methods and data
Machine learning is applied to the SAVIX database in order to identify which sustainable devel-
opment programs are the best predictors of the profit-generating capacity of grass-root financial
organizations across the world.
The Savings Groups Information Exchange (SAVIX) database has information of 250000 grass-
root financial groups in 52 countries around the world (Figure 4.5). The group-level data of
the SAVIX is collected in the field through an online system, the Savings Groups Management
Information System (MIS), which is supported by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, CARE,
Catholic Relief Services, Oxfam America and Plan International.
Machine-learning are supervised, semi-supervised or unsupervised algorithms that allow to
make predictions and create data-driven knowledge from a database. Applications of machine-
learning in sustainable development are promoted by the United Nations Secretary-General’s In-
dependent Expert Advisory Group on a Data Revolution for Sustainable Development (2014). Re-
cent applications of machine-learning include the identification of harmful environmental impacts
caused by unsustainable business (Can & Alatas, 2017) and the application of machine-learning
for monitoring the SDG indicators (Holloway et al., 2018).
In this study, two common machine learning methods are applied to the SAVIX: text-mining
and random forests.
Text-mining is an unsupervised process that seeks to extract useful information and identify
patterns in textual data (Feldman & Sanger, 2007). The text-mining implementation in this study
transforms the unstructured information of social interventions in the SAVIX into a corpus, i.e. a
collection of writing data about sustainable development programs. The corpus is processed and
summarized into a matrix of tokens, which is analyzed to find word frequencies and patterns. The
text-mining results are displayed with word-clouds, where the word size denotes the frequency of
a word in the corpus—see Weiss et al. (2015), Vijayarani et al. (2015) or Zhou et al. (2016).
Random forest are supervised algorithms that fit decision-trees to random subsets of training
data and use the combined result—the forest—for prediction (Breiman, 2001). Decision-trees split
the dataset into smaller subsets, with the aim of increasing the predictive power of the model for
the target variable (Genuer et al., 2017). In this study, the individual predictions from the trees
estimated with the SAVIX are combined into a final prediction of financial returns obtained by the
groups. The importance of each variable for returns is calculated with node impurity—a measure
of the splits that have a high inter-node variance and a small intra-node variance— and with the
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increase in the mean squared error of predictions (see Gregorutti et al., 2017).
A final decision-tree is estimated with the full sample (train and test) in order to find out
which development programs are the best predictors of the profit-generating capacity of grass-
root financial associations.
C.3 Results
The SAVIX data shows that grass-roots finance is provided to the poorest population living in
rural communities and urban slums in developing countries. In the database, 65% of the groups
operate in rural regions, 33% in urban slums and only 2% in urban regions. The average amount
of savings per member in the grass-root groups is 17.5 USD, with a median of 9.5 USD. The value
of loans provided to the members is on average only 12 USD, with a median of 6 USD (Table 4.7).
The low values of savings and loans show that grass-root finance provides financial services to the
extreme poor in the BoP.
Despite the low values of savings and loans in grass-roots associations, these groups have on
average returns on savings (ROS) equal to 45%, with a median of 36% (Figure 4.6). Allen and
Panetta (2010) explain that the high financial returns of grass-roots associations is the consequence
of groups charging monthly interest rates ranging from 5 to 10 percent. Moreover, Guha and
Gupta (2005) note that because members must repay the loan and pay interests, as well as
keep contributing with their savings, a surplus that boosts returns arises naturally in grass-root
associations.
In the SAVIX, 57863 grass-roots groups have records of having received a social intervention
from a development agency. The text-mining of the corpus of development interventions indicates
that the most frequent programs provided to grass-root groups are related to education, income-
generating activities and health (Table 4.8, Figure 4.7). Business training is not among the most
frequent interventions in grass-root financial associations.
One-hot encoding is used to translate the corpus to a binary matrix of development programs.
The matrix is included in the random-forest model to estimate which social interventions predict
higher returns. In order to control for other variables that could affect profit generation, group-
level characteristics and macro-economic variables are added as controls in the random forests13.
The number of variables that are randomly selected for splitting at each node of the trees
are selected with cross-validation14. In the cross-validation, the database is randomly divided
in a validation and a train set, with 65% of the data in the train set. The minimum value of
both the root mean squared error (RMSE) and the mean absolute prediction error (MAPE) is
obtained with 5 splitting variables (Table 3). Five splitting variables also maximize the correlation
of predictions in the test set against the estimations of ROS in the train set (Table 4.9 and Figure
4.6)15.
13The number of loans per member is included as a control covariate of operating efficiency and the
status of the group —supervised against graduated— is used to account for the stage of agency monitoring
(Ledgerwood et al., 2013). The welfare fund of a group was included as a control because the social
fund can act as a collateral mechanism to cope with risks. Population density and the percentage of
rural population of a country are included as macroeconomic controls because in less populated rural
areas transport costs limit the possibilities of members attending meetings, thus increasing the chances of
members not contributing with their savings and/or not paying their debts to the group (Christensen,
1993).
14Nicodemus & Shugart (2007) and Strobl et al. (2008) highlight that the ability of random forests to
detect influential predictor variables depends on the number of selected splitting variables.
15Out-of-bag (OOB) errors are also used to validate the random forest model. The OOB error is the
average error calculated using bootstrapped predictions from the trees with a specific number of splitting
variables randomly permuted during the estimation of the forest (Gregorutti et al., 2017). An OOB error
of 601.56 is obtained with 4 splitting variables, 594.91 with 5 splitting variables and 597.26 with 6 splitting
variables.
72
Figure 4.8 illustrates the results about the importance of each variable for profit generation
obtained with a random forest that has 5 splitting variables in each node.
The highest increase in MSE and node impurity is obtained for the variable loans per member,
indicating that loans are the main predictor of returns in grass-root financial associations. This
result is expected, because loan allocation is the main channel of profit generation in grass-root
associations. The fact that loans are identified as the best predictor of profit generation supports
the ability of the machine-learning algorithm to truly detect predictors of financial returns.
The welfare fund is the second most important factor that predicts higher returns in grass-
root financial associations (Figure 4.8). While the purpose of the welfare fund is to offer grants
or interest-free loans to cover emergencies and life-cycle events, Maliti (2017) found that groups
in Tanzania appeal to the welfare fund for loan repayment, a deviation from the original purpose
of the welfare fund that can increase returns.
In relation to development interventions, agricultural programs and training in WASH (water,
sanitation and hygiene) have the lowest effect on financial returns (Figure 4.8), while in contrast
development programs for the creation of small retail businesses have the highest predictive power
for the generation of returns in grass-root financial organizations.
Similar results are obtained with the final decision-tree estimated with the full dataset (Figure
4.9). Graduated grass-root groups that receive business training (1149 groups) have a median of
ROS equal to 99%, with an interquartile range of 37% to 126% (Node 15, Figure 5). Groups that
receive business training but are still supervised by a development agency have a median of ROS
equal to 75%, if the group has a welfare fund equal or higher than 1.24 USD (Node 14, Figure
4.9). Groups that received business training, but are still under supervision and have a smaller
amount of money in the welfare fund (less than 1.24 USD per member) have a median of returns
on savings equal to 48% (Node 13, Figure 4.9).
Health development programs are the second-best predictor of returns in grass-root financial
associations, when the groups manage to provide loans to their members. Graduated groups that
have received training in health and at the same time provide loans have an average rate of returns
equal to 75% (Node 9, Figure 4.9).
If no health or business programs are offered to the groups, social programs aimed to promote
income generating activities can also boost the financial sustainability of the groups (Figure 4.9,
Nodes 4 and 5), but on a lower magnitude compared to groups that received business training
and to those that are no longer under the active supervision of a development agency.
C.4 Discussion
Higher returns in grass-root financial associations help to ensure sustainable finance and the con-
tinuity of business and social development interventions. Groups with higher profits will have
more incentives to keep operating over time, and thus will keep providing informal financial ser-
vices to the poor. Likewise, financially sustainable groups will keep supplying social development
programs to vulnerable populations for longer periods of time.
The machine-learning results show that the most frequent interventions of development agen-
cies are related to education, income-generating activities and health. Business training is not
the most frequent development program offered to grass-root associations, but it is in fact the
most important predictor of financial returns, particularly for graduated groups already trained
by development organizations. In the practice, the findings imply that donors and managers of
development agencies interested in both social and financial sustainability at the BoP can make an
efficient use of scarce resources by implementing interventions of health and business training, be-
cause these programs will simultaneously promote both financial and social welfare of low-income
individuals participating in grass-root associations.
The findings also indicate that the staff hired by development organizations have to provide
enough training to allow groups to achieve graduation. The training staff has to encourage lead-
ership and trust within a group, as well as proactive membership and the ability and motivation
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to follow group rules (Delany and Storchi, 2012).
The findings of the study also contribute to theory-generation by suggesting that grass-root
business stimulated by development interventions can be thought as a new paradigm of sustainable
businesses at the BoP, complementary to the traditional paradigms of social enterprises (Hossain
et al., 2017) and corporate social responsibility (Kolk, 2016).
In the case of corporate social responsibility, Hoque et al. (2018) suggest that —both in
developed and developing countries— this paradigm tends to be a voluntary philanthropic fashion
not necessarily focused on improving social well-being but rather aimed to build public image and
enhance business profit. The businesses stimulated by grass-root financial organizations are on
the contrary created and owned by the members, and thus are primarily interested in improving
the lives of the participants.
Social enterprises on the other hand can be imposed on the poor by governments and de-
veloping agencies. In contrast to this centralized and authoritarian business model, grass-root
businesses spawned by grass-root financial associations answer to the necessities, possibilities and
expectations of the members.
Social enterprises also tend to prioritize social value over economic value (Seelos & Mair, 2005),
while in contrast the small businesses promoted by grass-roots groups focus on both, social and
economic value.
Business creation through grass-root finance is a community model that helps households
to smooth consumption and also aids individuals to self-finance their productive investments
in human and business capital (Karlan and Zinman, 2014). In the businesses created through
sustainable grass-root financial organizations, individuals raise capital from their community and
invest their money locally. Since grass-root businesses are locally owned and locally financed,
wealth-creation remains in the community.
Finally, this study has also implications for the efficient allocation of resources of governments
and development agencies interested in achieving the SDGs. The development programs promoted
through grass-root financial organizations are linked to the SDGs 1 (no poverty), 2 (zero hunger), 3
(health), 4 (education), 5 (gender equality), 6 (water and sanitation), 8 (decent work and economic
growth) and 13 (climate action). The results show that grass-root groups that receive business
training can achieve simultaneously multiple targets of the SDGs 8, 3 and 1.
Grass-root financial groups can also be a platform to implement other development interven-
tions, as for example programs to reduce psychological aggression and/or physical punishment to
children (SDG 16) or projects to provide sources of renewable energy (SDG 7)16. Future studies
can explore the simultaneous social and financial impact of these interventions, in order to improve
the efficient use of resources for development and create insights about additional opportunities
to make a stronger impact on the well-being of people around the world.
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Table 4.7: Descriptive statistics of the variables in the SAVIX database
Minimum Median Mean Maximum
Members attendance (%) 39.29 96.00 91.24 100
Dropout rate (%) 0 0 1.79 45
Number of loans outstanding per member 0 0.36 0.38 1
Women members in the group (%) 0 86.96 78.99 100
Group size (number of members) 5 21 21 34
Accumulated loans per member 0 0.30 0.75 133.33
Welfare fund per member (USD) 0 0.47 1.10 12.59
Fund utilization rate 0 40.44 41.25 100
Savings per member (USD) 0 9.52 17.46 139.21
Loan-value per member (USD) 0 5.70 12.06 116.22
Returns on savings (%) 1 35.71 45.33 156.12
Table 4.8: Text-mining results for the 12 more frequent words in the records of development
services offered to grass-root financial organizations in the SAVIX. The textual records of
development programs in the SAVIX database are written in English, French and Portuguese.
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Table 4.9: Cross-validation results to select the number of splitting variables in the models of
random forests
n-vars RMSE MAPE rho
1 27.6570 0.4743 0.5127
2 25.8645 0.4499 0.5496
3 25.2145 0.4409 0.5695
4 24.8961 0.4368 0.5789
5 24.7882 0.4362 0.5809
6 24.8208 0.4388 0.5786
7 24.9725 0.4440 0.5724
8 25.2004 0.4502 0.5640
n-vars: Splitting variables at each node
RMSE: Root mean squared error
MAPE: Mean absolute prediction error
rho: correlation between the estimations of ROS
in the train sample and the predictions made
by the model for the test sample
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Figure 4.5: Geographical distribution of grass-root financial groups in the SAVIX database.
Half of the groups in the database are located in eight African countries: Uganda (22702 groups),
Tanzania (21374 groups), Mali (21021 groups), Burkina Faso (13680 groups), Ghana (12337
groups), Mozambique (10244 groups), Senegal (10148 groups) and Kenya (8906 groups).
Figure 4.6: Left: Histogram of returns on savings (ROS) of grass-root groups in the SAVIX.
Right: Scatterplot of the ROS in the trained and test samples used for cross-validation in the
random forest.
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Figure 4.7: Text-mining of the sustainable development programs provided to grass-root
associations in the SAVIX. The size of the words represents the frequency of the records (higher
frequency, higher size). As part of the text-mining exercise, the records of development programs
in the SAVIX were transformed into a lower-case corpus and were cleaned from special characters,
English stop-words, punctuations, extra white spaces and numbers.
Figure 4.8: Results of the random forests. The importance of each variable for the generation
of returns in grass-root financial associations is measured with the increase in the mean squared
error of prediction (IncMSE, left) and the increase in node impurity (IncNodePurity, right).
IncMSE is the error of prediction caused by a specific variable being excluded from the model.
In the case of IncNodePurity, more relevant variables for prediction have a higher inter node
variance and a smaller intra node variance.
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Figure 4.9: Decision tree of sustainable development programs offered to grass-root financial
associations. In the graph below, n is the number of grass-root groups in each node of the tree.
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Bifurcations in business profitability: An agent-based simulation of
homophily in self-financing groups
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Abstract
Formal financial institutions inadequately distribute startup capital to business ventures of ethnic
minorities, women, low-educated, and young people. Self-financing groups fill this gap because
in these associations agents accumulate their savings into a fund that is later used to provide
loans to the members. This study builds and simulates an agent-based model that compares the
profitability of businesses started by members of self-financing groups against businesses financed
by commercial loans. The results indicate that—besides the self-generation of debt capital—
businesses of members of self-financing groups can have higher returns due to the consolidation
of social capital and the competitive advantage created through a dual process of homophily.
Higher quotas of savings boost profits, but only up to a threshold, after which a bifurcation
pattern—typical of complexity dynamics—emerges. The practical and theoretical implications of
the findings are discussed and future research lines are proposed.
D.1 Introduction
Small businesses have a cumulative economic impact on the economy due to their relevance for
long-term economic growth, productivity and job creation—see Acs and Armington (2006) or
Haltiwanger et al. (2016). In Sub-Saharan Africa for example, micro-enterprises employ an esti-
mated 80% of the working population Biekpe (2004), while in Colombia small business represent
96% of the enterprises created annually Santana (2017).
Despite their remarkable relevance, Cheng (2015) and Berger and Udell (2006) note that
the financing of small startups is limited by the informational opacity that hinders banks from
assessing the profitability, survivability and financial credibility of small ventures. Moreover,
ethnic minorities, women, low-educated and young people are disproportionately impacted by the
difficulties in accessing financial resources for business startups, even in developed countries17.
The limitations in business financing can be overcome through government grants and subsi-
dized loans. Due to the high cost of these policies, disadvantaged groups also rely on emerging
financing instruments such as loan guarantees, microcredits, crowd-funding, peer-to-peer lending
and business angel investment OECD (2014). One additional financing option for entrepreneurs
who want to start their own business is self-financing groups.
Self-financing groups are a form of community-based associations that act as small savings
and loan cooperatives of individuals Greaney et al. (2016). In a self-financing group, members
agree to periodically provide an individual quota of savings with the aim of creating a collective
pecuniary fund. The contribution is provided in group meetings during the life-cycle of a group.
The fund of savings accumulated during the meetings is used for internal loan provision to the
members.
Following Atlan (1991), self-financing groups can be conceptualized as a phenomenon of contex-
tual complexity. Contextual complexity emerges from the communication among heterogeneous
agents and the interaction of their goals. This pattern is typical of self-financing groups, because
in these associations heterogeneous members with bounded rationality actively interact with each
other over time, pursuing both personal and group-level goals, before and after a startup venture.
Due to its versatility, agent-based modeling is a computational approach suitable to capture
the contextual complexity of self-financing groups. Members of self-financing groups face budget
constraints and can exhibit random behavior, limiting the applicability of the traditional paradigm
17Smallbone et al. (2003) for example found that ethnic minorities in the UK are less successful in
accessing bank loans and thus have to appeal to informal sources of startup finance. Cheng (2015) further
remarks that this form of lending discrimination is even more pronounced with women and entrepreneurs
from minority groups, who face a higher rate of loan denial and have unequal access to commercial credit
from formal financial institutions. In the context of entrepreneurial activities in Europe, the OECD policy
brief on access to business startup finance for inclusive entrepreneurship OECD (2014) further highlights
that low-educated and young people are more likely to mention financing problems as a major constraint
on starting a business.
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of a representative, perfectly rational utility-maximizing agent (Farmer et al., 2005). In an agent-
based model of autonomous and non-homogeneous agents, as the one described in Macal and
North (2010), rational effects are dominated by stochastic fluctuations, and emerging social and
financial patterns arise from the interaction between the behavioral and strategic decisions of
heterogeneous agents with bounded rationality (Ponta & Cincotti, 2018).
In the agent-based model herein, agents decide to join a self-financing group due to intra-
household conflicts, homophily and lack of access to formal financial loans. The members of the
group are selected by an autonomous agent, who optimizes a gender-composition criterion (i.e.,
a preference for women members). Default rates are a function of the individual behavior of
agents and the interaction among agents. Homophily enables the creation of social capital among
members, which is aggregated to the debt capital generated by the group to start up a business.
The sequential simulation of the algorithms produces a complex system in which patterns emerge
from the interaction of agents at the micro level Pyka et al. (2018).
The results of the computational experiments in this study indicate that—due to homophily
and embedded relational dynamics—funding from self-financing groups can increase business prof-
itability compared to businesses financed through external loans, but only up to a bifurcation
threshold. Self-financing groups build social capital that is difficult to imitate, which contributes
as an additional resource to the success of a businesses initiative. However, after a threshold in
the savings quota, a bifurcation in profitability emerges as a consequence of household budget con-
straints, the mimicking default behavior of agents, and the high interest rates that self-financing
groups tend to charge for internal loans.
The findings of this study fill the research gap left by studies that have been traditionally
focused on formal financing of small businesses. The impact of providing formal credit to small
and micro business has been largely studied by inter alia Tuyon et al. (2011), Shahriar et al.
(2016), Newman et al. (2017), Evelyn and Osifo (2018) or Atmadja et al. (2018)—see also the
review of Chen et al. (2017). The conclusion of these studies is that formal financial institutions do
not properly provide seeding to entrepreneurship, see for example Field et al. (2013) or Nguimkeu
(2014). By contrast, there has been limited research on the impact of financing small business
through internal loans from self-financing groups, creating a research gap that this study fills.
This study also contributes to the field of agent based modeling and complexity in business by
using homophily to extend the recent literature on strategic group formation. In strategic group
formation, agents maximize their individual utility by deciding to join or leave a social group
Collins and Frydenlund (2018). Under a resource-view approach, the maximization of utility in
self-financing groups translates to acquiring more resources in the form of loans and/or social
capital. This study argues that homophily plays an additional ancillary role in strategic group
formation and can further promote business profitability up to a bifurcation point.
The rest of the study is organized as follows: Section D.2 offers a conceptual overview of self-
financing groups, agent-based modeling, social capital and homophily. Section D.3 describes the
agent-based model of self-financing businesses. Section D.4 presents the results of simulating the
model through computational experiments. Section D.5 concludes and discusses the practical and
theoretical implications of the findings. A replication package with MatLab codes and step-by-step
instructions to reproduce the results is also provided in an online supplementary material18.
D.2 Conceptual framework
D.2.1 Self-financing groups
Self-financing groups are community-based organizations formed by people related by affinities
or a specific goal Brody et al. (2015). The participants of a self-financing group join together to
achieve individual and/or collective targets, which can be related to business startups, investment,
18The MatLab replication package is freely available at:
https://nl.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/fileexchange/73961-agent-based-model-of-nano-finance-groups
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consumption-smoothing, asset acquisition or economic empowerment. The members of the group
achieve their objectives through the accumulation of savings, the provision of internal credit and
the creation of an informal insurance fund.
The roots of self-financing groups can be traced back to two types of indigenous associations:
rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) and accumulating savings and credit associ-
ations (ASCRAs). In ROSCAs, there is no loan provision because the pooled fund of savings
is distributed to the members in a rotating pattern. In ASCRAs, the savings are not instantly
redistributed but are rather accumulated in order to make loans with a fixed maturity Bouman
(1995).
Self-financing groups are promoted by formal banks, the government or non-governmental
organizations, who develop their own group schemes based on the principles of ROSCAs and
ASCRAs. According to le Polain et al. (2018), the best-known facilitated self-financing models are
the village savings and loan association initiated by CARE International, the savings and internal
lending communities promoted by Catholic Relief Services and the savings for changes model
promoted by Oxfam and Freedom from Hunger. In India, the National Bank for Agricultural and
Rural Development (NABARD) steered the concept of self-help groups focused on the management
of savings and credit Pillai and Abraham (2017).
Biggart (2001) relates the existence of self-financing groups to five situational circumstances:
a communally-based social order, obligations that are held to be collective in nature, social and
economic stability, social and economic isolation, and similarity between members. The research
evidence has also discussed the importance of self-financing groups for capital accumulation Alila
(1998), investment Hospes (1995), asset accumulation Annan et al. (2013), the promotion of
income generating activities—Allen (2006), Ksoll et al. (2016) or Flynn and Sumberg (2018)—
and the generation of social capital Ban et al. (2015).
Garikipati (2008) offers concrete examples about how self-financing groups can increase trust,
which is the basis for social capital. For example, members of a self-financing group may help each
other with childcare and livestock care without an explicit payment, or may help other members
in finding waged work. Feigenberg et al. (2014) provide experimental evidence that shows that
meetings of self-financing groups also aid to build social capital, measured by the number of times
the members talk with each other about businesses.
D.2.2 Social capital and homophily
Loury et al. (1977) define social capital as naturally occurring social relationships aimed at pro-
moting valued skills. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) understand social capital as resources accru-
ing from a durable network, institutionalized through mutuality of acquaintance and recognition.
Cooke and Wills (1999) make an additional distinction between human capital and social capital:
while both refer to acquired skills, qualifications and capabilities, in social capital assets are less
capable of formal certification.
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) propose three facets of social capital: structural, relational and
cognitive. The structural dimension refers to the degree of connectivity (the network) between
agents. The relational dimension—which is based on trust and trustworthiness Fukuyama (1995),
identity and identification Hakansson and Snehota (1995)—is based on the nature and charac-
teristics of relationships, which can be competitive or cooperative. The cognitive dimension is a
shared cognitive system of representations among agents, which can improve interpersonal com-
munication and enhance relationships between members within an organization see, Jiang and
Liu (2015, page 130).
Edwards and Foley (1997) raise two additional issues in the study of social capital: availability
and equality. First, social capital is not equally available to all individuals, because geographic
and social isolation limit the access to this resource. Second, not all social capital is created
equal: the value of a specific source of social capital depends on the socioeconomic position of
the individual within society. This inequality implies that agents will have heterogeneous levels
of social capital depending on their socioeconomic and geographical characteristics Hsung et al.
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(2017).
Theoretically, the importance of social capital for businesses can be seen from a resource-view
approach if social capital is conceptualized as a source of competitive advantage that adds value
to a venture, as in Jiang and Liu (2015). For instance, Bourdieu (1986) interprets social capital as
an aggregate of actual or potential resources, again linked by a durable network of relationships,
mutual acquaintances and recognition. N. Lin (2001) likewise suggests that social capital consists
of resources embedded in social networks accessed and used by agents.
The resource-view approach to social capital has led Batjargal (2003) to propose that het-
erogeneity in the structural, relational and resource-based aspects of social capital is reflected in
various aspects of business performance. The agent-based model of this study is based on the
premise of Batjargal (2003): self-financing groups build social capital that is difficult to imitate
and thus contribute as an additional resource to the success of a business initiative. Through a
process of homophily, embedded relations—that improve coordination and reduce organizational
conflict—influence purchase and sale decisions of entrepreneurs.
McPherson et al. (2001) define homophily as the principle that people tend to group with
others who are like them. According to Collins and Frydenlund (2018), the factors that determine
homophily include gender, religion, social class, education and other intrapersonal or behavioral
characteristics. Granovetter (1985) and Jiang and Liu (2015) argue that intrapersonal and be-
havioral characteristics of members of a group create dense ties that support stronger reciprocity
and greater trust. Social capital emerges from these dense ties, which minimize monitoring and
transaction costs by reducing opportunistic behaviors Uzzi (1997).
D.2.3 Agent-based modeling
Agent-based modeling can be traced back to the developments of complexity theory and artificial
intelligence—see Weisbuch (1991), Kauffman (1993), Order (1995), Langton (1997) or Macal and
North (2010). Complexity analyzes patterns and structures that emerge from interactions Kirman
(2010). Artificial intelligence, in turn, is a subfield of computer science aimed at building agents
that exhibit aspects of intelligent behavior in terms of autonomy, social ability, reactivity and pro-
activeness Wooldridge and Jennings (1995). Based on the interactions among intelligent agents,
agent-based models produce insights that guide decision-making, help to solve complex problems
and simulate real-life phenomena.
Hamill and Gilbert (2016) define an agent-based model as a computer program that creates
an artificial world of heterogeneous agents and enables the investigation of their interactions. In
this artificial world, agents react to other agents, pursue goals, communicate with other agents
and move around within the environment Wooldridge and Jennings (1995).
According to Macal and North (2010), an agent-based model has three elements:
(i) A set of agents, with attributes and behaviors.
(ii) A set of agent relationships and methods of interaction, i.e. a topology of connectedness
that defines how and with whom agents interact.
(iii) The environment. Besides interacting with other agents, agents can in some cases also affect
their environment.
Following Lemos (2017), an agent A can be defined as a computer system that is situated in
some environment and is capable of perceiving, deciding and performing actions in an autonomous
way. Formally, let E ∈ Z+ be the set of possible environment states, and let A ∈ Z+ be the set
of actions available to A, then the sequence of environment states alternating with actions of
A can be defined using the run of simulations R, where RA ⊂ R is the subset of runs ending
with an action, and RE ⊂ R the subset of runs ending with an environment state. Based on the
definitions above, an agent will be a function that maps runs ending in environment states into
actions: A : RE 7→ A see, Wooldridge (2009).
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An agent-based topology defines how agents are connected to each other. Typical topologies
are cellular automata Wolfram (2018), the Euclidean space, networks where nodes are the agents
and the links are relationships El-Sayed et al. (2012), spatial grids—based on a geographic infor-
mation system (GIS)—and aspatial topologies where agents have no location because it is not
relevant for the simulation at hand.
In some models, agents can also affect and modify their environment when the collective
action of multiple agents causes changes in the environmental state in which agents operate,
thereby generating the map A 7→ RE. See inter alia Sengupta and Bennett (2003), who use a
model of agents distributed in a geographical environment to simulate the ecological and economic
impacts of agricultural policies.
Emerging patterns are also a characteristic of agent-based models. As Macal and North
(2010) highlight, both the heterogeneity of agents and self-organization are features of agent-based
simulation that allow the emergence of complexity patterns. This emergence differentiates agent-
based models from other simulation techniques, such as discrete-event simulation and system
dynamics.
D.3 Agent-based model of self-financing businesses
Small businesses play an important role in economic growth and socioeconomic development
Tuyon et al. (2011). Startup businesses normally confront a shortage of capital and limited access
to loans from formal commercial banks and thus have to draw upon informal sources of startup
finance, such as micro-credits provided by formal finance institutions or internal loans obtained
from informal self-financing groups.
The agent-based model of this study aims to simulate the profitability of businesses financed
by self-financing groups. The business profitability of the self-financing group is compared to
the profitability of a counterfactual business financed with external loans from a formal financial
institution.
In the agent-based simulation of self-financing groups (henceforth, ABS-SFG):
— The set of active agents are (i) women and men of the working population in an artificial
community, and (ii) an autonomous agent in charge of creating the self-financing group.
Passive agents are children and the elderly in the community, who do not make decisions
but influence the behavior of active agents.
— The topology is defined in the Euclidean space Rn, i.e. the set of all real n-tuples Rn =
{(p1, ..., pn)|pj} for a real number pj in j = 1, 2, ..., n Abbena et al. (2017). The connected-
ness of the agent-based model in the Euclidean two-dimensional space R2 is calculated using
(i) the Euclidean distance between households and (ii) the Euclidean distance between the
intrinsic demographic characteristics of individuals.
— The environment is defined only by the interaction of agents with other agents. Agents
cannot change their environment.
The computational ABS-SFG model is a multilayered simulation of four algorithms that run
sequentially in two phases (Figure 4.10). The agent-based simulation illustrated in Figure 4.10 is
a ‘microverse’ containing the dynamics and environment of self-financing groups, as in Guterman
et al. (2015). The model creates an artificial world that emulates the behavior of the members
of self-financing groups in a village, as in the second-order simulacra of Baudrillard (1994), who
inspired the simulated reality of Wachowski and Wachowski (1999).
The four stages of the ABS-SFG model can be grouped into an initialization phase (algorithms
1 and 2) and a running phase (algorithms 3 and 4). In the first stage, the model starts simulating
a community of agents in an artificial village (algorithm 1). In the second stage, a self-financing
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group is formed by an agent that selects members from the individuals in the artificial village
who want to be part of the group (algorithm 2). In the third stage, heterogeneous agents in the
self-financing group interact with each other to accumulate social and debt capital (algorithm 3).
In the last stage, an internal loan is provided to agents for the creation of a business venture and
the profitability of a self-financing business is compared with the profitability of a counterfactual
business of non-members financed by a loan from a formal financial institution (algorithm 4).
Table 4.10 shows the submodels in the algorithms and lists the variables/traits included in
each submodel. Table 4.10 also indicates which equations are used to calculate the traits in each
submodel and further clarifies whether values are predetermined or produced by the model. The
next subsections describe in detail the equations and submodels in each algorithm.
D.3.1 Algorithm 1: Artificial community
Box 1 shows the first algorithm of the simulation model. Based on the number of households
(H), random numbers from probability distributions are used to create an artificial community
of agents that have three demographic characteristics: age (a), gender (g), and the number of
dependent individuals in the household (i.e. children and the elderly, δh).
The h-households in the village (h = 1, 2, ..., H) are populated with i-individuals based on
the numerical values of a centered probability mass function generated from a discrete Poisson
distribution:




The stochastic function in equation 4.1 was chosen to populate the households following V.
Jennings et al. (1999) and V. Jennings and Lloyd-Smith (2015), who show that a Poisson process
is suitable for modeling household size distribution. The number of productive individuals in the
household (δh) is obtained from random numbers of a discrete uniform distribution (equation
4.2), while the gender of each individual (gi) is obtained from numerical values of a conditional
uniform discrete distribution (equation 4.3):
δh ∼ U(1, uδ) (4.2)
gi|δh ∼ U(1, uδ,g), uδ,g = 2uδ. (4.3)






























where g ∈ {w,¬w} is a gender index for women (w) and men (¬w), under the assumption
that men in the population have (on average) higher income than women (µ¬w > µw) and less
dispersion around the average income (σ¬w < σw). The stochastic function for income was chosen
as log-normal because although income follows a Pareto law in the upper tail, the distribution of
the low-income population is normally described with a log-normal distribution; see for example
Souma (2001) or Banerjee et al. (2006). The assumption about the difference of the distribution
of income for women is based on evidence about the polarization of women’s employment and
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income, which has been related to occupational segregation, discrimination, work-life balance,
part-time work, career patterns across the life cycle and labor mobility—see Hakim (2016).
The first stage of the simulation produces a population matrix PAi with the following agent’s
characteristics: household location (h) of agents, identification of individuals (ih) in the popula-
tion, gender (gi), number of productive individuals in a household (δh), age of the agents (ai)
and income (yi). See Box 1 below.
Box 1. Algorithm 1: Artificial community
Data: H, λh, uδ, uage, µg, σg
Result: PAi 3 {h, ih, δh, gi, ai, yi}
for H← h do





δh ∼ U(1, uδ)
for ih ← i do
gi|δh ∼ U(1, uδ,g), uδ,g = 2uδ
ai =
∑


















D.3.2 Algorithm 2: Formation of a self-financing group
In the second algorithm, an autonomous field agent Af creates a self-financing group by selecting
members from the subset of the individuals PAi of the population PAi who want to join the group
(PAi ⊂ PAi). Due to the probabilistic nature of the agent’s wish to join a SFG—and due to the
optimization decision of the autonomous field agent when deciding on gender composition—the
m-number of members of a self-financing group is not programmed in the model, but is rather
one of the emerging patterns produced by the model.
Following the theory of strategic group formation Collins and Frydenlund (2018), agents join
or leave a group in order to gather social and financial resources. Besides this utility maximizing
behavior, homophily plays a role in the formation of self-financing groups. In the ABS-SFG model,
the probability Pi(m) of i-agents wishing to join a self-financing group is a quadratic mixture of
the probabilities related to their lack of financial access (fai ), the geographical proximity among
households in the village (ψhi ), the social connections among productive individuals (si), and



































In equation 4.6, ωPi(m) is the weight—the importance—that individuals assign to lack of formal
financial access, P(fai ). Lack of financial access in equation 4.7 is based on the probabilistic
transformation of the income of each individual in a household (yh,i). Demirgüç-Kunt et al.
(2008) argue that cost-effective micro-financial services are not available to the extreme poor due
to the imbalance between the fixed transactions costs of formal financial institutions and the
small transactions and low demand of the extreme poor, which cannot be compensated with
higher interest rates. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) add that, in the presence of imperfect and costly
information, the expected rate of return of banks increases less rapidly than the interest rate and,
beyond a point, may actually decrease, thus generating a credit-rationing effect in formal banking.
Hence, the low income of the agents in a village reduces the probability of having access to a
formal loan from a financial institution.
Homophily is implemented through the sigmoid functions 4.8 and 4.9, which transform to
probabilities the geographical proximity of households (equation 4.8), as well as the connections
among productive individuals (equation 4.9). Homophily plays a dual role in self-financing groups:
during group formation and during the life-cycle of the group. During group formation, homophily
interacts with the utility maximization behavior of agents who seek resource acquisition, because
self-financing groups are generally formed by peers who share similar socioeconomic and demo-
graphic characteristics. During the life-cycle of the group, homophily consolidates social capital
and reduces the risk aversion among agents.
In order to measure the probability of joining a group based on geographical homophily, the






and this distance is converted to a probability measure through the sigmoid function of equation
4.8, which assigns more homophily to individuals living in households near the center of the
village. The probability of joining a group due to social homophily in equation 4.9 is based on
the probabilistic transformation of the number of productive individuals in a household (ih,p).
Households with a large number of productive individuals have more social connections with
other productive agents, and thus have a higher probability of joining a self-financing group.
Finally, intra-household conflicts (equation 4.10) are measured by the number of dependents
in a household (ih,¬p), since a large number of dependent children and retired elderly can lead
to higher intra-household conflicts among productive members in relation to investment decisions,
and thus can increase the probability of agents joining self-financing groups. Conflictual inter-
actions within a household has been put forward by Anderson and Baland (2002) as one of the
main reasons to join self-financed groups when there are asymmetric preferences between men
and women about investment in household goods.
The set of members that want to be part of the self-financing group (PAi) is obtained with
a rejection sampling algorithm in which the candidates are agents PAi for which the mixture
probability Pi(m) in equation 4.6 is higher than a random number um ∼ U(0, 1), where U(·) is a
standard continuous uniform distribution.
The autonomous field agent Af selects the MAi members of the self-financing group from the
set of individuals that want to be part of the group, MAi ⊂ PAi (PAi ⊂ PAi). The autonomous
field agent Af that forms a group is commonly called ‘field officer’ by development agencies. Self-
financing groups are promoted by development agencies that hire and pay an agent—the field
officer—to create, train and supervise a group; see Allen and Panetta (2010).
The criterion of a field officer Af for selecting the members xi ∈ MAi , i = 1, 2, ...,m, is to have
more women than men in the group. This positive gender discrimination is related to the fact that
facilitating agencies—which pay and instruct the field officer Af—tend to target women because
they consider women to make a higher contribution to family welfare, since women give priority
to spending their earnings on their children Guha and Gupta (2005). Rasmussen (2012) also
attributes the gender focus of self-financing groups to women’s economic resilience, since savings
enable women to handle income shocks and confront unforeseen emergencies such as illness or loss
of employment Ghosh and Vinod (2017).
Formally, when selecting the members {x1, x2, ..., xm} ∈ MAi from the potential set of candi-
dates PAi , an artificial agent Af wants to achieve a gender ratio of women to men τ higher than
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τw ∈ (0, 1],
SAf(PAi , τ) =
{
x1, x2, ..., xm if τ > τw
∅ else
(4.11)
Equation 4.11 is computationally equivalent to a while loop. See the algorithm in Box 2 below.
Box 2. Algorithm 2: Formation of a self-financing group (group creation and
members’ selection)
Data: PAi 3 {h, ih, gi, δh, ai, yi}



























um ∼ U(0, 1)





while τ < τw do
SAf(PAi , τ)
if τ > τw then





D.3.3 Algorithm 3: Agent-based simulation of self-financing groups and for-
mation of social capital
Algorithm 3 simulates the dynamics of savings accumulation as well as the formation of social
capital among the members of a self-financing group. In the agent-based simulation, the emerging
patterns of members’ default and fund accumulation are the result of (i) the interactions among
members and (ii) an adaptive rule—a rule that changes the rules—for savings accumulation, which
is activated when a large number of members do not contribute with their savings to the group.
In a self-financing group, each i = 1, 2, ...,m-member contributes a ρ amount of savings to a
common fund during the life-cycle of the group (Burlando & Canidio, 2017). This life-cycle is a
round of meetings 1, 2, ..., t where the members get together to contribute their quota of savings
to the common fund. In the ABS-SFG model, the number of meetings t is equal to the number
of members m in a group, to account for the fact that larger groups need longer organizational
periods.
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The number of members of a group (m) is not predetermined but is rather an emergent
parameter produced by the interactions of agents in the model. The m number of members
of the simulated groups is similar to the number of members observed in real life: around 20
members. Bisrat et al. (2012) notes that SFGs have this number of members because—although
more members allow to accumulate a larger sum of money over a cycle—too many members involve
a greater number of administrative problems, thus creating an incentive to keep the number of
participants to around 20 members.
A member of a self-financed group enters a state of default in savings if the agent does
not contribute his/her quota of savings during a meeting t. In the model, this default state is
modeled as an inequality between the idiosyncratic probability of default Pi(ds) and the group-
level extrinsic probability of default Pe(ds, t):
Pi(ds) > Pe(ds, t) + u, u ∼ U(0, 1), (4.12)
where u is a random component from a uniform distribution U(0, 1) that models the unexpected
events that can increase the probability of default in savings.
The idiosyncratic probability of default Pi(ds) is a convex combination of each member’s
intrinsic probability of default, related to age (ai) and income (yi), and weighted by gender (γg):













where γg ∈ R0,1 and ωds ∈ R0,1 are predetermined parameters, Pds(ai) is the probability of
default related to the age of an agent, and Pds(ai) is the probability of default related to the
income of an agent.
In equation 4.13, the parameter γg ∈ R0,1 measures higher female repayment rates when
γg → 1, as reported in, for example, Mayoux et al. (2000) or Gonzales Martınez et al. (2019).
The probability of default related to the age of an agent Pds(ai) in equation 4.14 is calculated
using the inverse Euclidean distance from the centroid of the age in the group. The parameter
ωds is the weight (the importance) of age for the probability of default in savings. Pds(yi) is the
probability of default related to the income of an agent. Individuals with low income, compared
to the rest of the members, have a higher probability of entering a state of default in savings.
Likewise, individuals in the tails of the age distribution (young and older members) have a higher
probability of default, compared to other members. Gender is included as an interaction term,
assuming that women are financially more reliable and thus have a lower probability of entering
a default state compared to men—see Abbink et al. (2006) or D’espallier et al. (2011).
The extrinsic probability of default Pe(ds, t) depends on group-level characteristics that arise
from the interaction among members, the amount of savings contribution and the stage of meetings
in the life-cycle of the group:Pe(ds, t) := tanh ze ≡ sinhzecoshze = e
ze − e−ze
eze + e−ze








In equation 4.16, ρ is the individual amount of savings that each agent has to contribute to the
common fund. Higher amounts imply a higher burden for the individuals and thus increase the
probability of default. Parameter t is added to the default threshold ze to reflect the fact that the
probability of entering a default state increases over time. Conversely,
√
m reduces the probability
of default in larger groups, because peer pressure in such groups can act as a savings commitment
device. For example, Kast et al. (2012) conducted a randomized trial with microentrepreneurs in
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Chile and found that peers in savings groups provide a mutual service by regularly holding each
other accountable for setting savings goals and regularly reminding each other of these goals.
Agents that enter into a state of default in a meeting t − 1 will also affect the behavior of
other agents in the next meeting t, because non-defaulting agents that mimic the behavior of
defaulting agents will fail to deliver their quota of savings. This mimicking behavior is modeled
in equation 4.16 through a switching parameter β ∈ {βd, β¬d} that changes when agents enter a
default state d in the group (βd > β¬d). The predetermined parameter of mimicking behavior
β increases the chances that the rest of the non-defaulting members will enter a default state
when another member fails to deliver his/her quota of savings. Larger values of β imply that
a defaulting agent can strongly interact and dramatically affect the behavior of the rest of the
agents in a self-financing group.



















It is common in agent-based models to introduce adaptation, where agents learn or adapt by
changing their rules and behavior based on their experience and dynamic interactions Smith and
Conrey (2007). In the case of a self-financing group, a high default rate in savings can dramatically
reduce the fund accumulated for loans. Thus, to compensate for this reduction, an adaptive rule
(‘a rule that changes the rules’) is introduced in the agent-based model (equation 4.18): groups
with a high default rate of savings (dt
m
> τd) change the pattern of fund accumulation from
a fixed scheme to a solidarity scheme, in which non-defaulting members provide an additional
contribution—ρ(1 + u), u ∼ U(0, 1)—beyond the quota (ρ) due at each meeting t, in order to
stabilize the collective savings fund bt over time. See the algorithm in Box 3.
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Box 3. Algorithm 3: Agent-based simulation of self-financing groups and for-
mation of social capital
Data: MAi , ρ
Result: km 3 {kl, ks}












for meeting← t do
u ∼ U(0, 1)
β ∈ {βd, β¬d}
Pe(ds, t) := tanh ze = e
ze − e−ze
eze + e−ze






if d∀i(t− 1) = 1 then








































The agent-based algorithm in Box 3 produces two outputs: debt capital (k`) and social capital
(ks). Debt capital is a fraction of the accumulated fund b and is discussed in section D.3.4. The
formation of social capital, in turn, is the result of the homophily among the participants of a
self-financing group.
The quantitative operationalization of social capital in the model is based on the multilevel
ecometric approach of Raudenbush and Sampson (1999). This approach allows one to differentiate
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between individual and area-level sources of variation in social capital Mackenbach et al. (2016).
Formally, social capital is calculated as a function of the Euclidean distance between individuals
in an artificial community, in terms of the homophily related to their age (‖ai‖), income (‖yi‖)
and household location (‖hi‖):





































A multiplying gamma factor (γs) is included in the formula of social capital of equation 4.19
to account for the impact of being part of a self-financing group. The parameter γs accounts
for the fact that non-default members of a self-financing group create additional bonds of trust,
trustworthiness and reciprocity. These resources, according to Putnam (1993), promote their
ability to undertake collective actions, such as starting a joint business venture.
In the case of agents that are not part of a self-financing group, their social capital is a function
of their own homophily (i.e., γs = 1 for ¬MA), while in the case of non-defaulting members of
a self-financing group γs > 1 because the ratio of defaulting members to the total members of
a group is added to the scale parameter of social capital (equation 4.20). This implies that in
a group with a large number of defaulting members (d), stronger social bonds of trust will be
created among the remaining non-defaulting members m− d.
In equation 4.21, less social cohesion is assigned to individuals that are not closer to the
average age of the population (a), on the basis of studies of reduced social capital in young and
elderly populations (Lauder et al., 2006). Lower social bonds are also allocated to individuals
that have an income in the tails of the distribution (equation 4.22), since income inequality has
been found to be related to a reduction in social cohesion; see Khambule and Siswana (2017).
Finally, less contextual social capital is assigned to individuals that live in households located
in the village periphery (equation 4.23). This last area-level allocation of social capital is based
on the literature on neighborhood formation of social capital; see Butler and Robson (2001) and
Forrest and Kearns (2001).
D.3.4 Algorithm 4: Loan allocation and business simulation
Box 4 shows the last stage of the simulation (algorithm 4). In the last algorithm, agents start a
joint business venture with the social capital and the debt capital obtained after being part of a
self-financing group. It is assumed that the group members start a business together; this a direct
result of homophily and tends to be common in low-income groups of women, as those served
by self-financing groups. See, for example, the cases of informal businesses in Africa described in
Spring (2009).
The probability of members receiving a loan (`) from the self-financing group is conditional
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on the income (yi) and social capital (ks,i) of an i-individual:










A member of the SFG will receive a loan if his/her probability of receiving a loan is higher
than the ex-post risk aversion of the self-financing group (rpost):
P(`|yi, ks) > rpost
> r− f(ωr;ks,(m−d)) (4.25)
In equation 4.25, r ∈ R0,1 is the ex-ante risk aversion of the SFG. This is the risk aversion toward
providing loans at the start of the group meetings. This risk is updated by non-defaulting members





In the function f(ωr;ks,(m−d)), ξ is the standard scientific notation ξm × 10ξn , for which a
mantissa and an order of magnitude of ξm = ξn = 1 generate a smoothed curve saturated toward
the asymptote ωr (Laird, 1964); this is, the social capital of the non-defaulting agents ks,(m−d)
reduces the ex-ante risk aversion of the SFG only up to an asymptotic ωr-probability:
lim
ks,(m−d)→∞+ f(ωr;ks,(m−d)) = ωr.
A value of 0.5 was chosen for the asymptotic risk-reduction probability ωr (the hyperparameter
ωr = 0.5), based on Laplace’s uncertainty principle: if no additional information about the
reliability of the potential borrowers is available, in the limit the SFG members assume that all
possible events are equiprobable; see inter alia Gurov (2005).
The amount of the loan allocated to the borrowers (`) is a fraction of the total savings in the
common fund (b),
k` := ` = b(1− rpost), (4.26)
with an effective interest rate equal to the nominal interest rate plus the updated (ex-post) risk
aversion of the self-financing group,
i` = i + rpost. (4.27)
Equations 4.25, 4.26, and 4.27 capture the pattern of loan provision and bucketization of interest
rates—as a function of risk aversion—that was observed empirically by Paravisini et al. (2016) in
peer-to-peer lending platforms. In the model, borrowers are jointly liable for the loan `, as joint
liability makes borrowers responsible for repaying each other’s debt, which encourages risk sharing
among the members who take a loan Attanasio et al. (2016). As Chen et al. (2017) highlight,
this type of group lending lowers operating costs due to diligence and monitoring, and therefore
increases the likelihood of loan repayment by shifting the bulk of monitoring costs from lenders
to groups.
The performance of the business created by the non-defaulting members of the SFG and the
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counterfactual business of non-members is calculated using the stochastic business model below:
debt = `(1+ i`) (4.28)
inventory(t=0) = `(1− θ`) (4.29)
salest = m (inventoryt) (4.30)













ROA = (ā−1)returns. (4.34)
In the model, the total debt capital of the business is the result of adding the amount of the loan
borrowed by the SFG members plus the interest rate charged for the loan (equation 4.28). At the
start of the business (at time t = 0), a fraction (θ`) of the borrowed loan is set aside to buy retail











which is boosted by the social capital of non-defaulting members (ks,(m−d)) but can be lessened
by the macroeconomic environment—the GDP growth—of a country (η).
Equation 4.31 is a mathematical description of a simple cash flow in the business: income
is obtained by sales at time t, minus the loan repayment quota qt. The returns at the end of
the period T (equation 4.32) are the sum of the cash flow minus random expenses related to
unexpected events (εe). Returns on assets (ROA)—more precisely, returns on average assets—
are obtained by dividing the business utility (equation 4.32) by the average assets of the business
(equation 4.33). The formula of ROA in equation 4.34 is based on the business-success indicators
suggested by the International Finance Corporation (2008) to evaluate micro, small and medium
enterprises.
The simplified businesses model simulated in equations 4.28 to 4.34 is motivated by Herranz
et al. (2015), who found that risk-averse entrepreneurs run smaller, more highly leveraged firms,
which default less because running a smaller firm with higher debt reduces the number of personal
funds at risk in the firm. In the model, a simplified balance sheet is assumed where assets are an
addition of the income derived from sales plus the inventory and fixed assets acquired with the
loan. The liabilities of the business are only the loan repayments qt. Fixed assets are assumed
to depreciate to zero at the end of the life-cycle of the business, and thus the utility at the end
of the period is computed as the aggregate income from sales minus the total expenses incurred
in paying the capital and interest of the loan, along with the expenses caused by unexpected
(random) events.
Social capital enters the business model through improvements in market allocation pushed
forward by the social capital of the borrowers in equation 4.30. Following Batjargal, 2003, the
heterogeneity in the structural, relational, and resource-based aspects of social capital is reflected
in various aspects of business performance because embedded relations influence the purchase
and sale decisions of entrepreneurs. Also, as noted by Ling-Yee (2004), social capital helps to
integrate the existing knowledge of members with the unique information from the market m.
This in turn helps the group to update its knowledge, endow it with meaning, and translate it
into organizational routines.
The counterfactual business simulation of non-members is also based on equations 4.28 to
4.34. The ABS-SFG model (randomly) chooses agents from the population of the village who
were not part of the self-financing group. The selected agents create a business under the same
financial conditions of the business created by the members of the self-financing group, i.e. the
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same loan amount and interest rate. Using the same financial conditions in both the self-financing
business and the business financed with formal loans allows us to isolate the financial effects from
the effects on business performance caused by social capital.
Box 4. Algorithm 4: Business simulation
Data: km 3 {k`, ks}, φ ≡ i
Result: ROAφ,s
for S ← s do










for Φ← φ do
is,` = φ+ rs,post
debts = `s(1+ is,`)
for T← t do
inventorys,(t=0) = `s(1− θ`)
saless,t = ms (inventorys,t)

















D.4 Results of computational experiments
This section runs s = 1, 2, ...,S simulations of the agent-based model of self-financing groups.
The index s denotes running a single sequence of the whole model (the four algorithms described
in Section D.3), and hence S is the total number of simulations of the ABS-SFG model. For
example, when s = S = 1, only a single village, one self-financing group, and one business are
simulated—for an illustration of this simulation see the Appendix. If S = 1000, then 1000 villages
are randomly populated and 1000 different groups and businesses are generated in each village.
D.4.1 Counterfactual experiment of business performance
Tables 4.13 and 4.14 and Figure 4.11 show the results of a counterfactual experiment of business
performance based on 1000 simulations of the ABS-SFG model (s = 1, 2, ..., 1000;S = 1 × 103).
The experiment compares the returns on assets (ROAφ,s) of 1000 businesses created by non-
defaulting members of 1000 self-financing groups against 1000 businesses created by non-members
in 1000 artificial communities.
The experiment simulates the impact of annual loan interest rates equal to 10% to 70% on
ROAφ,s (φ ∈ {.1, ...,Φ = .7} , φ ≡ i in equation 4.27) for different values of savings contribution
ρ in self-financing groups. The large values of the interest rates are based on the fact that
borrowers in self-financing groups typically pay interest rates of 5% to 10% a month, according to
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Rasmussen (2012). Table 4.11 shows the numerical values used to initialize the model. The main
characteristics of the experiments are summarized in Table 4.12.
When annual interest rates are below 40%, the profitability of the businesses financed with
loans from the self-financing groups is on average higher compared to the profitability of businesses
financed with commercial loans (Table 4.13). When the savings quota is ρ = 30MU, for example,
the average return of the businesses in the self-financing groups is 5.89%, while the average return
of the businesses financed with commercial loans is -3.31%. The risk of the businesses financed
with commercial loans is also higher, equal to 5.67%, compared to the average risk of the businesses
of the self-financing groups (4.25%).
For annual interest rates between 40% and 70% and for savings contributions of ρ = 30 and
ρ = 40, negative returns are observed both for the businesses financed with commercial loans
and for the business financed with commercial loans from self-financing groups. The businesses
in the self-financing groups have positive returns only for quotas of savings equal to ρ = 50 and
ρ = 60 (Table 4.14). For a savings quota of ρ = 40MU the average return of the businesses
in the self-financing groups is -3.29%, while the average return of the businesses financed with
commercial loans is -30.48%. If the savings quota rises to ρ = 50MU, the returns of the businesses
in the self-financing groups increases on average to 4.82%. This last result is the consequence of
social capital in the self-financing group, which becomes important in the presence of costly debt
capital.
Figure 4.11 reveals an emergent pattern in the dynamics of the returns of businesses financed by
self-financing groups: bifurcation. For values of the savings quota ρ equal to 40MU and 50MU,
the businesses of the members of self-financing groups tend to outperform the profitability of
the businesses of the non-members (Figures 4.11a and 4.11b). When the savings quota exceeds a
threshold of ρ = 60 (Figure 4.11c), however, business performance splits into two branches (Figure
4.11d): in the lower bifurcation branch, the businesses of self-financing groups have average returns
of -5.72% to 8.11%, while in the upper branch these businesses have returns of 20.32% to 27.47%.
The risk, measured by the standard deviation of the returns, is also low in the lower branch of
the simulated business of SFG members (Tables 4.13 and 4.14).
The bifurcation is caused by a quota of savings that exceeds a threshold of tolerance and
creates nonlinear dynamics in the business profitability of self-financing groups. An extremely
high quota of savings is a burden for agents with a restricted budget, which leads to savings
default. Savings default is imitated due to the interaction of defaulting members with other
group members, and as a consequence the group ends up having only a small fund available for
loans. A lower amount of loans, in turn, leads to lower returns in the businesses created by the
non-defaulting members, which generates the lower bifurcation branch in returns.
On the other hand, if members of the self-financing group manage to accommodate to the
higher quota of savings and do not enter a default state, then the other members mimic their
fulfilling behavior and hence at the end of the life-cycle of the group a larger fund is available for
loans. The higher amount of loans, added to the social capital formed through homophily, boosts
the profitability of the businesses created by self-financing groups, thereby generating an upper
branch in the bifurcation pattern.
D.5 Conclusion
Atlan (1979, 1991) develops two complementary concepts of complexity: algorithmic complexity
and contextual complexity. Algorithmic complexity is based on optimization, whereas contextual
complexity is based on the communication among heterogeneous agents with conflicting goals
Vasconcelos and Ramirez (2011). In this study, self-financing groups are considered a phenomenon
of contextual complexity and an agent-based model is proposed to simulate how these groups form
and create businesses in an artificial community.
The results allow us to conclude that the startup businesses of self-financing groups are more
profitable and less risky compared to businesses financed with commercial loans, even with high
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interest rates, when social capital is properly consolidated. The consolidation of social capital
is a consequence of the interaction among agents in the self-financing group. Social capital com-
plements the debt capital in the fund available for loans, creating a competitive advantage that
increases business profitability.
Higher quotas of savings in the group were found to boost profitability by raising the collective
fund available for loans, but only up to a threshold, after which a bifurcation in returns appears.
This bifurcation—typical in complexity dynamics see, Gao et al. (2016)—is a branching process
of the dynamical system in which the topological structure switches to different states due to
a change in a bifurcation parameter Crawford (1991). In the ABS-SFG model, the bifurcation
parameter is the quota of savings agreed among members of a self-financing group. The bifurcation
implies that field officers—hired by development agencies for the task of managing a group—face
a trade-off between two possible states when raising the savings quota of a self-financing group:
while the bifurcation parameter is a potential source of profit, increasing the quota of savings
exacerbates also the risk of group failure.
The emerging findings of the study indicate that self-financing groups create a competitive
advantage for business, as a consequence of the social capital formed in the group through ho-
mophily. Social capital, according to K.-H. Lin et al. (2016), constitutes an additional production
factor that influences the competitive power and economic development of a venture, because
social capital is based on network ties and thus it is a non-substitutable resource that cannot be
acquired through imperfect imitation19.
The theoretical implication of the findings is that homophily plays a dual role in self-financing
groups. Following a resource-view approach, group formation is based on the maximization of
utility by acquiring more resources in the form of loans and/or social capital. In this study, we
argue that homophily plays a complementary role to utility maximization during the formation of
a group. Homophily among members consolidates social bonds and reduces risk aversion during
the life-cycle of a group. Social bonds translate into stronger cohesion, trust and peer pressure
among members, which reduces the chances of default and facilitates organizational strategies20.
The study also has managerial implications for traditional competencies, networking and
market appreciation21. First, in a business of a self-financing group, traditional managerial
competencies—such as finance, accounting, marketing, personnel management technologies, or-
ganizational procedures and routines Vasconcelos and Ramirez (2011)—are necessary to manage
internal issues, and coordinate, motivate and select priorities. Second, due to the networking na-
ture of self-financing groups, additional managerial competencies are required to construct value
co-production systems on the basis of the collaboration and arrangements between members.
Finally, through contextual listening, businesses of self-financing groups are able to appreciate,
evaluate, question, and understand the general trends that compose the transactional environ-
ment.
Future studies can explore the business impact of self-financing groups that include a compo-
19The findings on the importance of social capital are consistent with the empirical study of Bosma
et al. (2004), who find that investment in social capital enhances entrepreneurial performance of small
businesses in terms of survival, profits, and generated employment. Torres et al. (2018) show also that
social capital increases revenues and is a key asset for the long-term resilience of small businesses.
20While Bosma et al. (2004) relate the impact of social capital on firm performance to productivity and
signaling, this study argues instead that the impact of social capital on the performance of businesses in
self-financing groups is related to the cohesion created by homophily, which reduces organizational conflict.
Previous studies found that intra-organizational social capital has a significant impact on the performance
of new ventures Baum et al. (2000), because in business startups members are in unfamiliar roles and face
new work relationships during a time of stretched resources. Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) further regard
social capital as an organizational resource, and Stinchcombe (2000) propose that the performance of a
new firm is significantly affected by the organizational conditions surrounding its founding. As Vasconcelos
and Ramirez (2011) highlight, complexity, in this view, is a manageable dimension that can contribute to
organizational learning.
21According to Vasconcelos and Ramirez (2011), management copes with complexity at three different
levels: managerial competencies, networking and contextual listening.
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nent of human capital besides social capital, as well as the role of friendship in business perfor-
mance and the potential competitive advantages of a transactive memory system in self-financing
groups22. While self-financing groups often focus on individual ventures, a joint business creates
a competitive advantage for group members due to the combined effect of debt capital and the
social capital generated through a dual process of homophily. Business training—which improves
human capital—further encourages the competitive advantage of joint businesses.
Development agencies who work with self-financing groups as a platform to provide communi-
ties with sustainable development programs—like entrepreneurship, agriculture, adaptation to cli-
mate change, health and sanitation, or programs of literacy, education, and women empowerment—
can use the ABS-SFG model as a cost-effective virtual laboratory to perform artificial experiments.
The impact of intervention programs and social policies can be evaluated ex ante through the arti-
ficial experiments in the virtual laboratories. Investigations about the impact of business interven-
tions are a promising research avenue, since Gonzales Martínez (2019) finds that business training
is not the most frequent intervention offered to self-financing groups by development agencies, but
is in fact the most important program to encourage financial sustainability, particularly after a
development agency leaves the community where a group operates23.
As shown in this study, agent-based modeling offers fascinating opportunities to understand
and explore phenomena through a set of flexible computational tools. The simulations of agent-
based models inform decision-making and allow one to formulate theories, that can guide empirical
research and the interpretation of experimental evidence Chávez-Juárez (2017). In contrast to
results estimated from observational data, the findings in agent-based models emerge from the
interactions among heterogeneous agents in artificial worlds Gilbert and Troitzsch (2005); thus—as
noted by Vermeulen and Pyka (2017) and Pyka et al. (2018)—agent-based modeling is a platform
to experiment with complexity in a microverse of simulated realities.
22Self-financing groups can raise human and social capital through financial literacy. Engström and
McKelvie (2017) argue that financial literacy addresses an individual’s ability to internally assess the
benefits and costs of an entrepreneurial opportunity. As Nguimkeu (2014) highlights, entrepreneurship
requires not only financial capital but also human capital in the form of education, experience, and skills
to develop ventures—see Radhakrishnan (2015).
Self-financing groups improve human capital during the meetings of the group by providing members
with training in entrepreneurial skills and financial literacy. Engström and McKelvie (2017), after analyzing
a dataset of 739 micro-enterprises in Ecuador, find that the impact of this training leads to improved
financial performance of micro-enterprises in the informal economy. More recently Tsai, Yang, et al. (2018)
found that human capital, measured by education and experience, improves vendor profit.
In the case of friendship, Batjargal (2003) finds that friendship ties affect firm performance negatively,
because friendship leaves little room for maneuvering and creates financial concessions that harm a
business’s revenues and profit margins.
23Gonzales Martínez (2019) provides large-sample empirical evidence of the importance of business
for self-financing groups, based on machine-learning methods. Theoretically, self-financing groups can
improve business performance because these groups are a vehicle for the formation of a transactive memory
system, which consists of the knowledge stored in each individual’s memory combined with a metamemory
containing information regarding the different teammates’ domains of expertise. Xu (2016)—building on
Wegner (1987), Uzzi (1997), Nadler et al. (2003), Borgatti and Cross (2003), and Argote et al. (2003)—
indicates that strong relationships help the members of a group to develop transactive memory systems due
to frequent interactions that facilitate reciprocal understandings of complex problems and consequently ease
the transfer of complex information because of the norms of reciprocity and cooperation associated with
social cohesion. As Xu (2016) concludes, this cognitive orientation influences how entrepreneurs develop a
business plan, plan for a business operation, obtain funding to begin product/service development, and
launch their startup.
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Figure 4.10: Schematic representation of the agent-based model of self-financing groups
(adapted from Rebaudo et al., 2011). The figure illustrates the multilayered structure of the
ABS-SFG model: SFG dynamics and business performance are the result of the interaction
between external factors—the macroeconomic environment and the facilitation mechanisms of
development agencies—plus the internal behavior of the individuals in the artificial community
and the members of the self-financing group. The model is a sequence of four algorithms:
Algorithm 1 randomly creates an artificial population inhabiting households in a village: working-
age women, working-age men and household dependents (children and the elderly). Based on
socioeconomic characteristics, homophily and intra-household conflict, some individuals of the
working-age population want to join the SFG. In Algorithm 2, an agent hired by a development
agency (the field officer) forms a SFG by choosing members from the individuals that want
to be part of the SFG. Member selection is based on a gender rule (a preference for women).
Algorithm 3 simulates the dynamics of the self-financing group: members allocate their savings
into a common fund in each meeting and then take a joint loan from the accumulated fund.
Social capital is created through homophily as the result of participating in the SFG. Algorithm
4 simulates the financial performance of a business started by the SFG members that do not fail
to contribute with their savings. The performance of the business of the SFG is compared with
the performance of a counterfactual business financed by a loan obtained from a formal financial
institution.
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Table 4.10: Structure of the agent-based simulation of self-financing businesses (ABS-SFG)
Phase/algorithm Variables/traits in each submodel Equations
Initialization
Algorithm 1: Generation of an artificial community
Households
◦ Family size Centered Poisson distribution (eq. 1)
◦ Intra-household productive individuals Uniform discrete distribution (eq. 2)
◦ Intra-household gender composition Uniform discrete distribution (eq. 3)
Village
(community)
• Number of households in the village None (initialization parameter)
◦ Age profile in the village Mixture of uniform distributions (eq. 4)
◦ Income profile in the village Log-normal distribution (eq. 5)




◦ Probability of joining a SFG Mixture of probabilities (eq. 6)
◦ Social bonds (homophily) Sigmoid function (eq. 7)
◦ Geographical distance (homophily) Sigmoid function (eq. 8)
◦ Intra-household conflicts Sigmoid function (eq. 9)
◦ Lack of access to financial services Sigmoid function (eq. 10)
Field officer
(agent) ◦ Gender ratio of women in the SFG Conditional function (eq. 11)
Running phase





◦ Probability of not contributing with savings Stochastic inequality (eq. 12)
◦ Group-level probability of default in savings Hyperbolic tangent (eq. 13)
• Amount of savings quota of each member None (simulation parameter)




◦ Idiosyncratic probability of default in savings Mixture of probabilities (eq. 14)
◦ Income of SFG members Sigmoid function (eq. 15)
◦ Age of SFG members Sigmoid function (eq. 16)
• Gender risk of not contributing to the SFG None (simulation parameter)
Savings
accumulation
◦ Savings accumulation in the common box Accumulation of contributions (eq. 17)
◦ Adaptative rule in the case of default Stochastic addition of savings (eq. 18)
• Threshold of SFG failure None (simulation parameter)
Social
capital
◦ Social capital (function of homophily) Homophily among members (eq. 19)
◦ Impact of participating in SFG Scale factor (eq. 20)
◦ Age differences among members Inverse Euclidean distance (eq. 21)
◦ Income differences among members Inverse Euclidean distance (eq. 22)
◦ Household distance among members Euclidean distance (eq. 23)
Algorithm 4: Loan provision and business simulation
Loan
allocation
◦ Probability of receiving a loan Social capital and income (eq. 24)
• Risk aversion (ex ante) None (simulation parameter)
◦ Risk aversion (ex post) Updated risk aversion (eq. 25)
◦ Amount of the loan allocated to borrowers Fraction of total savings in the box (eq. 26)
◦ Effective interest rate charged to loans Interest rate plus risk aversion (eq. 27)
Business
performance
• Fraction of assets allocated to inventory None (simulation parameter)
• Impact of the macroeconomic environment None (simulation parameter)
◦ Total amount of debt (principal + interest) Debt function (eq. 28)
◦ Inventory Initial inventory (eq. 29)
◦ Retail sales Income gained from sales (eq. 30)
◦ Cash flow Income flow minus loan repayments (eq. 31)
◦ Utility (returns) Returns minus random expenses (eq. 32)
◦ Average assets Assets over the period (eq. 33)
◦ Returns on assets (ROA) Returns divided by average assets (eq. 34)
◦ Market sales Function of social capital (eq. 35)
Notes on simulation values:
(•) Predetermined
(◦) Produced by the model
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Table 4.11: Numerical values used to initialize the ABS-SFG model
Phase/algorithm Numericalvalues Notes on parameter values
Initialization
Algorithm 1: Generation of an artificial community
Family size λh = 2 Parameter of a centered Poisson distribution.
Intra-household productive
individuals and gender com-
position
uδ = 3 Upper parameter of a uniform integer discrete distribu-
tion. The lower parameter is always one because there is
always one productive individual in a productive house-
hold
Number of households in
the village
64 Number of households in a village
Age profile in the village uage = 20 Upper parameters of a mixture of discrete uniform dis-
tributions




First and second parameter of a log-normal distribution.
Lower values of µ (compared to those of men) imply
that the central tendency of the income distribution of
women is lower than that of men. Higher values of σ
imply that the income differences are more dispersed
across individuals
Algorithm 2: Formation of a self-financing group (SFG)
Overall probability of join-
ing a SFG
ωPi(m) = .55 Weight (importance) of lack of access to financial ser-
vices for the agents that want to be part of the SFG
Gender ratio of women in
the SFG
τw = 0.7 Minimum percentage of women in a group required by
the field officer
Running phase
Algorithm 3: SFG dynamics of savings accumulation and formation of social capital
Mimicking behavior β = .007 Larger values increase the probability that non-
defaulting members will enter a default state when a
member fails to deliver her/his quota of savings
Idiosyncratic probability of
default in savings
ωds = 0.5 Weight (importance) of income and age in the probabil-
ity of not contributing with savings
Gender risk of not con-
tributing to the SFG
γg = 0.7 Women have less probability of failing to contribute
their savings, compared to men
Threshold of SFG failure τd = 0.2 Maximum tolerance for the percentage of members fail-
ing to contribute their savings
Algorithm 4: Loan provision and business simulation
Risk aversion (ex ante) ωr = 0.8 Initial (ex ante) risk aversion of the group against al-
locating loans. This risk aversion is updated after the
members experience being part of a SFG
Fraction of assets allocated
to inventory
θ` = 0.65 Larger values imply that a higher proportion of the loan
amount will be used to buy inventory for retail sales
Impact of the macroeco-
nomic environment
η = 0.05 Impact of economic growth on market sales. Larger
(smaller) values will increase (decrease) the business
sales
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Table 4.12: Main characteristics of the experiments
Parameter Values
Nominal interest rate (φ ≡ i) 10% to 70%
Savings quota (ρ) 30, 40, 50, 60, 70
Table 4.13: Business simulation results: Loan interest rate in the range of 10% to 39.9%




Average returns 5.89 -3.31
Risk 4.25 5.67
ρ = 40
Average returns 11.95 -3.17
Risk 3.43 5.65
ρ = 50
Average returns 17.03 -0.18
Risk 2.83 5.24
ρ = 60
Average returns 25.21 18.03
Risk 2.10 2.92
ρ = 70
Average returns [27.47, 8.11] 21.35
Risk (2.16, 2.82) 2.61
Note: When ρ > 60, a bifurcation pattern appears in returns
ROA: returns on assets
Average returns: average ROA in the 1000 simulations
Risk: standard deviation of ROA in the 1000 simulations
Table 4.14: Business simulation results: Loan interest rate in the range of 40% to 70%




Average returns -13.58 -30.76
Risk 7.44 11.01
ρ = 40
Average returns -3.29 -30.48
Risk 5.65 10.95
ρ = 50
Average returns 4.82 -25.29
Risk 4.42 10.03
ρ = 60
Average returns 16.66 5.25
Risk 3.03 4.75
ρ = 70
Average returns [20.32, -5.72] 10.84
Risk (2.67, 6.22) 3.90
Note: When ρ > 60, a bifurcation pattern appears in returns
ROA: returns on assets
Average returns: average ROA in the 10000 simulations
Risk: standard deviation of ROA in the 10000 simulations
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(a) Savings quota ρ = 40 (b) Savings quota ρ = 50
(c) Savings quota ρ = 60 (d) Savings quota ρ = 70
Figure 4.11: Agent-based simulation of business performance. When ρ < 60, the performance
of the businesses of the members of self-financing groups is higher compared to the performance
of the businesses financed with commercial loans. After the bifurcation point (ρ > 60), in
the lower bifurcation branch groups fail to generate enough financial capital—because many
members fail to contribute to the common fund—and their businesses perform worse than those
of non-members. In the upper bifurcation branch, members adapt to the high quota of savings
and create additional social capital, boosting the performance of their business initiatives.
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Appendix: Illustration of the dynamics of the ABS-SFG model
with one single simulation
This appendix illustrates the dynamics of the ABS-SFG model by showing the results of running
only one simulation. Figure A1 shows the results of simulating one artificial community with H =
64 households. Each box represents a household. Blue squares in the households are productive
men, red triangles are women, and black dots are the dependents in the household (children and
non-working elderly populations). The parameter H calibrates the number of households in a
community.
In some households there is only one woman or man and one dependent agent, while in other
households there is more than one agent of the working population and also several dependents
(Figure A1). In the simulated community, there is a total of 364 individuals, 175 of which are
men and 189 are women (the gender ratio is .93). In the village, 232 individuals are dependents
agents and 132 are agents of the labor force.
Figure A1 (left) also shows the distributions of age and income in the artificial village. The
distribution of income is skewed—a common feature of income distributions—with a bulk of
individuals in the average income and some individuals with high income in the right tail of the
distribution. The income distribution of men is set higher compared to that of women, in order to
simulate gender disparities in income commonly found in empirical studies. Figure A1 (left) shows
also that the average age in the population is 43 years, with some individuals having less than
20 years and others having close to 70 years. The age dependency ratio is 1.76 in the simulated
community, reflecting the fact that the community has more dependents than workers.
The number of members of a self-financing group is an emergent parameter of the agent-based
model. In a single simulation for ρ = 40 with a fixed seed (Figure A2), a group of 18 members is
created by an artificial field agent. In the group, 15 agents are women and 3 are men, indicating
the preference of the field agent for women. The members of the group selected by the field agent
yield a gender composition of the self-financing group equal to τ = 15/18 ≈ 83% of women.
In terms of group dynamics, Figure A2b shows that in the fourth meeting a member of the
group (a man) fails to contribute his quota of savings. Due to the mimicking behavior of agents,
other members of the self-financing group also start to fail to contribute to the common fund by
the middle of the life-cycle of the group (Figure A2c). By the end of the life-cycle of the group—in
the last meeting—only 9 members—7 women and 2 men—have not failed to contribute to the
common fund of the self-financing group (Figure A2d).
Table A1 and Figure A3 show the impact of changing the amount of savings quota ρ that each
member has to contribute to the self-financing group. When the members of the group contribute
an individual quota of 30 monetary units (MUs), ρ = 30MU, there is no default since no member
fails to contribute to the fund (Figure A3a). For a quota of ρ = 40MU, half of the members in the
group fail to contribute to the fund (Figure A3b). When the quota is ρ = 50MU, 15 members fail
to contribute to the fund (Figure A3c) and when the quota is ρ = 60MU the individual savings
contribution is too high and all of the members fail to contribute, leading to the failure of the
group (Figure A3d).
The simulations of the impact of ρ show that higher quotas of savings can increase the common
loan fund, up to a point beyond which raising the quota starts to reduce the common fund. An
extremely high quota of savings causes members to default, which eventually decreases the fund
available for startup loans. The number of defaulting members is related both to the individual
circumstances of each agent and also to the interaction among agents. At the individual level,
an extremely high quota of savings creates a heavy burden for the members of the self-financing
group, due to household budget constraints. At the group level, due to a mimicking behavior and
the stochastic interaction among agents Kirman (2010), agents have fewer incentives to contribute
to the common fund if they observe that other agents are failing to contribute to the fund.
Finally, Figure A4 shows the social bonds of the agents before and after joining the self-
financing group, for a quota of ρ = 40MU. Homophily—due to age, income, and household
location—generates links among agents that increase the social capital in the group. The growth
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of social capital in the self-financing group is caused by the fact that during the life-cycle of the
group, agents repeatedly meet with each other, strengthening their bonds. This is particularly
true for those members that already had a tight social network before joining the group; for
example, the female agents 16 and 15, and to a lesser extent the male member 7; see Figure A4).
Figure A4 also reveals the inequality in social capital that the model aims to capture; i.e., agents
have heterogeneous levels of social capital depending on their socioeconomic and geographical
characteristics, as noted by Hsung et al. (2017).
Table A1: Results of the agent-based simulation on group dynamics
Savings quota
ρ = 30 ρ = 40 ρ = 50 ρ = 60
Total amount collected in the fund (MU) 9720 8520 5784 4961
Number of default members 0 9 15 18
Non-default members (end of the cycle) 18 9 3 0
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Figure A1: Simulation of a community of H = 64 households. Each box represents a household.
The households are inhabited by men (blue squares) women (red triangles) and children and
non-working elderly populations (black dots). H can be modified to simulate smaller villages with
few households or larger villages. Due to the random creation of villages, different simulations
produce different household compositions. The high proportion of low-income individuals in the
village and the gender disparities related to a higher income inequality for women can be seen in
the left-skewed distributions of income in the village (Figure A1 left). The distribution of age
indicates a concentration of the population between 30 and 50 years, but with a high number
of dependents compared to the labor force population, as shown in the demographic indicators
below:
Population: 364 individuals
Men in the community: 175
Women in the community: 189
Gender ratio: 0.93
Dependents in the community: 232
Labor force (productive population): 132
Income distribution of the agents in the community.
Men income (median): 328.67 mu
Women income (median): 243.42 mu
Age distribution of the agents in the community.
Average age of the productive pop: 43
Age dependency ratio: 1.76
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(a) First meeting (b) Fourth meeting
(c) Middle of the cycle (9th meeting) (d) End of the cycle (last meeting)
Figure A2: Agent-based simulation: one single self-financed group, savings quota ρ = 40. All
the members contribute their savings to the common fund in the first meeting of the group. A
male agent fails to contribute from his savings in the fourth meeting, and due to the mimicking
behavior of other agents, 9 of the 18 original members of the group end up failing to contribute
their savings to the common fund of the self-financing group.
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(a) Savings quota ρ = 30 (b) Savings quota ρ = 40
(c) Savings quota ρ = 50 (d) Savings quota ρ = 60
Figure A3: Agent-based simulation of a self-financing group with different values of savings
quota (ρ). Low values of the individual savings contribution (ρ = 30) are not a burden for
members of self-financing groups, but when the savings contribution increases to ρ = 60, members
start to fail to contribute to the common fund, due to household budget constraints and the
mimicking behavior of agents.
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Figure A4: Social capital in a self-financing group with a savings quota of ρ = 40MU. At the
start of the life-cycle of the group, non-members and members of the self-financing group have
similar social capital. At the end of the life-cycle of the group, non-defaulting members have
higher social capital due to the strengthening of social bonds during the meetings. Female agents
16 and 15 have stronger social bonds with other members compared to other female and male
agents (as agent 7). Thus, the heterogeneity in social bonds leads to inequality in social capital.
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